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ABSTRACT 
Under provisions of United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1244, elements of 
the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU) 
became the de facto government of Kosovo following NATO’s 1999 air campaign 
against Serbian forces suspected of committing atrocities against the province’s ethnic 
Albanian population.  On February 17, 2008, after just under a decade of international 
administration, Kosovo declared its independence and was recognized by the United 
States and other Western powers in the following days.  Given the emphasis placed on 
respecting Yugoslavia’s sovereignty and preserving its territorial integrity in numerous 
official texts, including Resolution 1244, why is Kosovo now recognized as an 
independent state by much of the world?  This examines historical, institutional, and 
systemic explanations for Kosovo’s independence.  It concludes that while all three 
explanations have some merit, only the systemic explanation has sufficient explanatory 
power to stand on its own.  This explanation holds that, by pursuing a “Standards before 
Status” approach, the international administration of Kosovo exacerbated the existing 
polarization between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians by failing to provide incentives for 
concessions.  Contrary to stated goals, this approach contributed to the creation of a de 
facto independent Kosovo state. 
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In the spring of 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted 
a 78-day air campaign against Serbian targets in response to reports of atrocities 
committed against Kosovo’s ethnic-Albanian population by Serbian forces.  An 
agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United Nations (UN) to 
end the air campaign led to the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1244.  This 
resolution contained two seemingly contradictory clauses that reflected the sharp 
divisions within the Security Council over NATO’s unsanctioned military action and the 
lack of international consensus as to Kosovo’s final status.  The first clause stated in 
essence that the United Nations would not be party to the further partitioning of 
Yugoslavia, while the second prescribed autonomy for the Muslim, ethnic Albanian-
majority province of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia.1 
Under the resolution, elements of the international community2 became the de 
facto government of Kosovo.  The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK), aided by the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), assumed initial responsibility for the administration of 
governmental functions.3  NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) provided security services in 
conjunction with member candidate and non-member states.4  UNMIK and KFOR 
achieved only intermittent success as they set about implementing the provisions of 
UNSCR 1244, and Kosovo’s ethnic-Albanian and Serb populations maintained their  
 
                                                 
1 United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 1244, “On the Situation Relating Kosovo,” 10 
June 1999, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf. 
2 For the purposes of this study, the term “international community” refers to the major international 
institutions (e.g., UN, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE), together with their major constituent members (e.g., 
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) responding to and/or having 
equity in the Kosovo crisis. 
3 Ibid., Annex 2, para. 5. 
4 Ibid., Annex 2., para. 3–4. 
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polarized, estranged relationship.  Many of the former’s numbers were bolstered by the 
return of displaced Kosovar Albanians who had fled the abuses perpetrated by the Serb 
security forces.5 
After five years of administration by UNMIK and KFOR, Kosovo experienced 
vicious anti-Serb riots in March 2004.  Sparked by now-disputed media reports that three 
Kosovar Albanian youths had drowned on March 16 after being chased into the Ibar 
River by Serb antagonists, the riots spanned 48 hours and appeared to overwhelm the 
response capabilities of KFOR, UNMIK’s civilian police force (CIVPOL, composed of 
policemen from contributing nations), and the locally-sourced Kosovo Police Service 
(KPS.)6  By the time the rioting ended, 19 people were dead, almost 1000 were wounded, 
over 4000 were displaced, and over 700 homes were damaged or destroyed.7  
Significantly, 30 Orthodox churches and monasteries were also destroyed.8     
On February 17, 2008, after just under a decade of international administration, 
Kosovo declared its independence9 and was recognized by the United States the 
following day.10  Although Serbia quickly renounced the declaration,11 a total of 72 of 
the 192 member states comprising the UN subsequently recognized Kosovo’s 
independence, including 22 of the 27 member states of the EU and 24 of the 28 members 
of NATO.12  Having preemptively made it clear it would never recognize an independent 
                                                 
5 Human Rights Watch, “Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004,” Human 
Rights Watch 16, no. 6 (July 2004): 7–8, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kosovo0704.pdf. 
6 Miklós Haraszti, “The Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo,” Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, 22 April 
2004, 4, http://www.osce.org/item/2926.html.  
7 Human Rights Watch, “Failure to Protect,” 62. 
8 Human Rights Watch, “Failure to Protect,” 62. 
9 Republic of Kosovo Assembly, Resolution D-001, “Kosovo Declaration of Independence,” 17 
February 2008, http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635. 
10 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State,” news release, 18 
February 2008, http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100973.htm. 
11 Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Declaration of Kosovo Independence–Gross 
Violation of Serbian Constitution, Resolution 1244, UN Charter,” news release, 14 February 2008, 
http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id=43141. 
12 “Who Recognized Kosova as an Independent State?” accessed 10 December 2010, 
http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/indexkty.php?order=a#recognitions. 
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Kosovo,13 the Belgrade government sponsored a UN General Assembly Resolution 
requesting an “Advisory Opinion” from the UN’s “principal judicial organ,”14 the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), regarding Kosovo’s declaration of independence.15  
Serbia contended the declaration was a violation of international law, the UN Charter, 
and UNSCR 1244.16  On July 22, 2010, the ICJ issued its ten-to-four majority opinion, 
declaring that it found no breach of international law in Kosovo’s declaration.17  
Although at least one expert on International Law predicted that in the wake of the ICJ 
decision up to 30 additional states might recognize Kosovo,18 as of this writing only 
three—Honduras, Kiribati, and Tuvalu—have done so.19  Serbia has since renewed its 
pledge not to acknowledge Kosovo as an independent state.20  
B. PURPOSE 
Various elements of the international community espoused competing goals 
during both its 1999 military intervention in Kosovo and its post-conflict administration 
of the Yugoslav province:  respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia 
                                                 
13 Republic of Serbia, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, “Serbia Will Never Recognize Kosovo-
Metohija’s Independence,” news release, 11 February 2010, http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?id= 
43070. 
14 The International Court of Justice, “The Court | International Court of Justice,” http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1.  According to this site, “The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations (UN).” 
15 UN General Assembly, Resolution 63/3, “Request for an Advisory Opinion of the International 
Court of Justice on whether the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of Kosovo is in Accordance with 
International Law,” 8 October 2008, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/470/97/PDF/ 
N0847097.pdf. 
16 Republic of Serbia, Office of the Prime Minister, “Kostunica Calls upon U.S. to Annul Decision to 
Recognise Independence of Kosovo,” news release, 24 February 2008, http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest. 
php?id=43550. 
17 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141 (22 July), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf. 
18 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Legal Scholar Previews ICJ Ruling On Kosovo's 
Independence,” 21 July 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/Legal_Scholar_Previews_ICJ_Ruling_On_ 
Kosovos_Independence/2106053.html. 
19 “Who Recognized Kosova as an Independent State?” accessed 10 December 2010, 
www.kosovothanksyou.com. 
20 Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Serbia Will Continue Defending Kosovo-Metohija 
by All Available Diplomatic Means,” news release, 3 August 2010, http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest. 
php?id=68002. 
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versus autonomy for Kosovo.  Kosovo’s declaration raises several questions.  Given the 
emphasis placed on sovereignty and territorial integrity in numerous official texts such as 
UN resolutions and NATO statements, why is Kosovo now recognized as an independent 
state by much—albeit certainly not most—of the world?  Did the UNMIK and KFOR 
policies, together with the manner in which those organizations implemented them, play a 
contributing role?  Did the anti-Serb riots of March 2004 play a causal role in Kosovo’s 
independence, or were they merely a manifestation of the sentiments entrenched on both 
sides of the Kosovo dispute?  This thesis seeks to determine if a correlational or causal 
relationship exists between the international intervention in Kosovo and Kosovo’s final 
status as an independent state.  The main question it seeks to answer is:  How did the 
international administration of Kosovo following the 1999 NATO military intervention 
impact Kosovo’s final status? 
C. IMPORTANCE 
Although possessing unique characteristics, in many ways the events in Kosovo 
represent a metaphor for the dilemmas that daunt—and often, haunt—international 
interventions, whether purely humanitarian in nature or consisting of parallel 
humanitarian and military efforts.  A conflict dyad exits here between sovereignty (as the 
"dean" of modern international relations principles) and self-determination (as the main 
principle espoused by the namesake and legacy of the twenty-eight American president, 
Wilsonian Liberalism).21  Over the course of the debate leading up to NATO’s ten-week 
military campaign and the near-decade of subsequent international administration, 
Kosovo became a metaphorical crucible within which the strength and resilience of these 
principles were tested.  An examination of how each principle contributed to the 
accomplishment—or failure thereof—of stated goals for Kosovo may yield important 
lessons for planning and conducting future interventions, as well as clues to which 
circumstances most favor one principle relative to the others.  The imperative for this  
 
                                                 
21 David Fromkin, Kosovo Crossing: American Ideals Meet Reality on the Balkan Battlefields (New 
York: Free Press, 1999), 127. 
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examination stems from the plethora of separatist and irredentist movements worldwide 
that might generate ethnic conflict and thus invite intervention similar to that which 
occurred in Kosovo. 
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
1. Unintended Consequences? 
Perhaps no arena suffers more miserably from the law of unintended 
consequences than does international relations.  From British Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain’s Munich concessions to German Füher Adolf Hitler in the name of “peace 
for our time,”22 to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to base nuclear-armed 
missiles in Cuba in order to discourage an American attack on the Communist island,23 
history is replete with the unexpected results of undertakings of both good and ill intent.  
While independence was always an eventual possibility in the case of Kosovo, the 
manner in which it occurred has called into question whether the UN, KFOR, and their 
component members appropriately weighed the competing principles of human rights, 
self-determination, and state sovereignty and territorial integrity.  In addition to exploring 
the thesis question above, this study seeks to contribute to the ongoing dialogue regarding 
the proper balance among these principles. 
Closely related to the concept of intent is that of interest.  This study will examine 
the motives at work behind the postures struck and actions taken by the main participants 
in the Kosovo intervention—important considerations that might otherwise remain 
obscured within the hallway shadows of UN Headquarters, the White House, the 
Kremlin, and their counterparts in Brussels, Belgrade, and Priština.  Such inspection will 
edify discussion of the sovereignty/self-determination dyad by characterizing the causes 
of why each principle fared as it did within the Kosovo crucible.  How the major member 
                                                 
22 The Official Site of the Prime Minister’s Office, “Neville Chamberlain,” 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/history-and-tour/prime-ministers-in-history/neville-chamberlain. 
23 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, 
Brown & Co., 1971), 47.  See also Nikita Sergeevich  Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, trans. and ed. 
Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970), 494. 
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states of the UN Security Council and NATO perceived the conflict almost certainly bore 
directly on how each approached the resolution process, within the context of not only 
planning the intervention but also in implementing that plan—“boots on the ground,” as 
the saying goes—inside Kosovo.  For example, previous experience with Slobodan 
Milošević during the conflict in Bosnia and Hercegovina (BiH) appears to have had a 
strongly negative influence on opinions of the Serbs held by many Western powers, 
particularly the Clinton Administration in the United States.  Because recent events 
played a larger role in shaping opinion than did an informed consideration of the region’s 
history, the resulting intervention made several missteps that hindered achievement of the 
plan’s goals. 
2. Whence Kosovo? 
This study approaches the existence of an independent Kosovo state as a mystery.  
It examines three alternate explanations of Kosovo’s independence in an attempt to find 
the motive, means, and opportunity by which Kosovo achieved independence.  The first 
explanation is historical:  it suggests a centuries-old mutual antagonism between 
Kosovo’s ethnic-Albanian and Serb populations was an insurmountable obstacle to 
coexistence, and that partition was not only inevitable but also preferable regardless of 
UNMIK and KFOR’s presence and actions within the province.  Because this explanation 
holds that Kosovo’s independence was primarily a function of internal factors as opposed 
to stemming from the international intervention, it effectively serves as a “null 
hypothesis” that the international administration of Kosovo was not a factor in Kosovo 
achieving independence.  The second explanation is institutional.  The premise of this 
explanation is that the provisional Albanian-dominated government in Priština had 
achieved a capacity that warranted tacit, if not overt, approval for independence.  The 
third explanation is systemic.  This explanation invokes the law of unintended 
consequences and asserts that the manner in which the various international organizations 
accomplished (or attempted to accomplish) their administration of Kosovo created 
systemic conditions that contributed to the province’s unilateral declaration of 
independence, and without which it would have been unable to do so.  
 7
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A satisfactory treatment of each alternate explanation above calls for a broad 
scope of literature.  Fortunately, an extensive body of such literature exists, covering the 
history of Serbia and Kosovo up to and including NATO’s Allied Force military 
intervention and the UN/OSCE/KFOR administration of Kosovo.  For the purposes of 
this study, this body is broken down into three categories corresponding to the three 
possible explanations detailed above.  The historical literature category revisits Kosovo’s 
history as a means to evaluating the historical explanation for Kosovo’s independence.  
While the preponderance of materials reviewed for the background category typically 
address the Serbian perspective, two points bear noting:  first, Kosovo was part of Serbia 
for most of this time period; and second, Serbian experiences, interests, and motives both 
affected and influenced the ethnic-Albanian population of Kosovo.   
The institutional literature category consists mainly of UN, OSCE, EU, and 
NATO official documents appraising the progress of institution-building efforts in 
Kosovo since the province came under international administration in 1999.  This 
category also includes independent analyses of these organizations’ efforts.  The source 
documents for the systemic category are of similar origin to those of the institutional 
category, but focus more on the actual—vice intended—consequences of international 
administration, including second-order effects.  Because many of these documents are 
useful for analyzing both explanations, such documents will be discussed collectively as 
opposed to dividing them into separate groups. 
1. Historical Literature 
Few would dispute the assertion that, to some extent, all nations are a product of 
their history.  A robust body of literature covers the history of the Balkans region in 
general, and that of Serbia and Kosovo in particular.  Robert Kaplan’s haunting 
travelogue, Balkan Ghosts, depicts the region and its citizens as captives to a violent past:   
“‘[h]ere we are completely submerged in our history.’  .... I asked them about the past.  
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Only in this way could the present become comprehensible.”24  Kaplan’s work reportedly 
influenced the Clinton Administration’s policies for dealing with the ethnic strife in the 
former Yugoslavia.25 
Stevan Pavlowitch’s Serbia: the History of an Idea traces the historical trajectory 
of the Serbian nation from a collection of distinct communities linked to lineage and 
territory, through its coalescence under dynastic rule, Ottoman suzerainty, autonomy, and 
finally independence at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, to become the ambitious, 
nationalistic state that dominated the Balkan Wars fought in the biennium preceding the 
outbreak of World War I.26  Although focused mainly on the Serbs, Pavlowitch also 
offers consideration of the Kosovar Albanians, noting their descent from mountain 
abodes to the fields of Kosovo left vacant by the Serbs who pushed north in the face of 
the Ottoman advance.27 
Noel Malcolm’s Kosovo: A Short History complements Pavlowitch’s treatment of 
Serbia.  Although the subtitle is somewhat of a misnomer, Malcolm’s 356-page work 
traces many of the same events as Pavlowitch’s much shorter (by 120 pages) Serbia, but 
from a Kosovar perspective.  In contrast to Kaplan, Malcolm downplays the role of ethnic 
dissimilarity as a source of ancient antagonism.28  The work also provides significant 
insights into Milošević’s use of nationalistic rhetoric in order to consolidate his political 
power. 
In The Balkans: A Short History, Mark Mazower, like Pavlowitch, peels back 
Balkan history in layers.  He opens his work with a brief lesson in European geography, 
describing features and terrain that quickly strike the reader as having parallels outside 
                                                 
24 Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 
xxi. 
25 Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 157.  Drew 
points out that, in addition to President Clinton, Mrs. Clinton and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Colin Powell had also read at least portions of the book.  Testifying before Congress, Clinton’s 
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, “described the Bosnia issue as ‘a problem from hell,’ a ‘morass’ of 
ancient hatreds among the Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, with ‘atrocities on all sides.’” (162) 
26 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Serbia: The History of an Idea (New York: New York University Press, 
2002), 64–5. 
27 Pavlowitch, Serbia, 15. 
28 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1998), xxix. 
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the physical realm:  the tectonic plates of race, religion, language, and culture also collide 
in the Balkans.  Mazower observes that these fault lines lay exceptionally dormant, 
becoming active only “recently” with the advent of nationalism.29  The one exception is 
religion, an ever-present dynamic differentiating Christian Europe from Muslim Asia 
and, within Christendom, Catholicism from Orthodoxy.   
Several other works of historical nature provide insight into the Serbia-Kosovo 
dynamic.  Leften Stavrianos’ The Balkans, 1815-1914 instructively chronicles two 
important events that may have influenced Serbia’s post-Yugoslavia course.  The first 
was Russia’s sacrifice of Serb ambitions at the Congress of Berlin,30 which taught Serbia 
an important lesson about relying too heavily on the fickle fidelity of a Great Power that, 
no matter how kindred in spirit, has its own interests to look after.  The second was the 
outbreak of the Second Balkan War in 1913, which demonstrated how quickly 
yesterday’s ally can become today’s adversary when respective nationalist and irredentist 
ambitions no longer run parallel.  
Primary sources from the first half of the twentieth century provide important 
insights into the Balkan nation- and state-building that occurred as Europe’s dynastic 
empires—the Ottomans and Hapsburgs—began to die off.  The Other Balkan Wars, a 
modern reprinting of the 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry into the First and Second 
Balkan Wars, offer a then-contemporary perspective on the two conflicts that many 
historians regard as having precipitated the First World War.  Vaso Čubrilović provides 
an unvarnished commentary on Serb-Albanian relations in “The Expulsion of the 
Albanians by the Serbs,” a 1937 treatise documenting what the author perceives as 
Serbia’s shortcomings in “dealing with” Kosovo’s Albanians.31   
Further exploring the relationship between identity and territory in nation- and 
state-building, George White’s Nationalism and Territory describes how “South Slavs 
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[including the Serbs] began to define themselves ... according to language use and 
religious affiliation.”32  This notion of “constructed” identity—an important 
foreshadowing of the rampant nationalism of the post-Yugoslav era—is reflected in the 
writings of others, such as Andrew Wachtel33 and Edin Hajdarpašić, the latter of whom 
writes of the competition between socialists, nationalists, and Muslims to reinterpret the 
historical narrative of the Ottoman legacy according to their respective perspectives.34   
John Fine’s chapter in Balkan Strongmen documents the rise of Josip Broz to 
power as Marshal Tito, the Communist Partisan who reunited Yugoslavia after World 
War II.35  Mazower also examines Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito.  He depicts Tito as a 
sort of twentieth-century incarnation of Bismarck, creating an elaborate, delicate political 
construct that he alone could sustain.   Tito’s death set the stage for the collapse of his 
Yugoslav federation, the rise of Milošević on the surging tide of Serb nationalism, and 
the resulting NATO and UN intervention.  As before, Mazower’s focus is not so narrow 
as to exclude the Kosovar Albanians, whose irredentism he describes as being stronger 
than most Balkan peoples “because they had been deprived for so long of their 
freedom.”36 
Finally, no review of this subject could be considered complete without an 
acknowledgement of Rebecca West’s Black Lamb and Grey Falcon,37 the epic 
travelogue written on the eve of the Second World War.  A consummate raconteuse, 
West all but overwhelms her reader with details in her attempt to convey the spectrum of 
vivid emotions, pleasant and bitter, that she finds in the people whom she encounters.   
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Although her work cannot be considered academically rigorous, its intimate depiction of 
Balkan life inculcates a fuller appreciation of the deep-seated beliefs and raw passions 
that permeate the region. 
2. Institutional and Systemic Literature 
Analyzing the institutional and systemic explanations requires a different 
approach from the historical explanation. Many of the works relevant to these 
explanations are primary sources in report or transcript format, often drawn directly from 
the organizations involved in the administration of Kosovo.  As will be discussed shortly, 
media reports and independent analyses also represent important source documents.  As 
previously mentioned, many of these documents are useful for analyzing both the 
explanations.  Of these, the most relevant consist of UNMIK documentation on the 
“standards before status” policy. 
One element important to both explanations is the degree to which NATO’s 
military intervention and the subsequent international administration of Kosovo were 
perceived as legitimate by the Serbs, the Kosovar Albanians, and the most influential 
members of the international community.  Because the institutional explanation depends 
on deference to the rule of law as opposed to superior force, the legitimacy of Kosovo’s 
institutions—a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for their success—is at least 
indirectly tied to the legitimacy of the international intervention and administration that 
led to their creation.  This linkage stems from the previous discussion regarding human 
rights and state sovereignty, and has important ramifications for both the institutional and 
systemic explanations. 
A notable work in this vein is historian David Fromkin’s Kosovo Crossing, an 
American-centric analysis of the American-led NATO campaign against Milošević’s 
Serb forces.  Although large tracts of this short work describe events that precede Allied 
Force, Fromkin’s focus on the present situation in Kosovo never softens.  Fromkin speaks 
directly to the sovereignty/self-interest dyad in his analysis of Woodrow Wilson’s 
ambitious Fourteen Points and in his observation that the struggle between Serbia and  
 
 12
Kosovo, like its antecedents elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, are “a rebellion against 
the terms and principles of the ... Paris Peace conference,”38 where Wilson’s Liberal 
principles so often failed to carry the day. 
One example of academically rigorous, post-Allied Force literature is the 
International Peace Academy’s analytical compendium The UN Security Council: From 
the Cold War to the 21st Century.  Part 1, “New Concerns,” and Part 3, “Evolving 
Institutional Factors,” together examine several issues relevant to the underlying 
principles of the Kosovo intervention.  Part 4 includes an analytical retrospective on the 
Kosovo intervention by Paul Heinbecker, who describes NATO’s unilateral decision to 
act without first obtaining Security Council approval as an attempt, in the face of an 
intransigent Russia and a wary China, to “save the Council from itself by bypassing it.”39  
Heinbecker’s observation speaks directly to the perceived legitimacy of NATO 
intervention and the UNMIK and KFOR administration missions that followed.  Such 
perceptions may have influenced not only how these missions were received by Kosovo’s 
Serbs and ethnic Albanians, respectively, but also how they were carried out by the 
contributing nations.  
The Madrid-based Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo 
Exterior has published a similar work, Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII: 
Design, Implementation and Accountabilities.40  Débora García-Orrico’s chapter on 
Kosovo further explores the concept of legitimacy in the international intervention and 
details numerous coordination shortcomings within and between UNMIK and KFOR.  
Other Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
and the International Crisis Group (ICG) produce targeted independent assessments of 
UNMIK and KFOR.  These assessments offer analytical reviews and propose specific 
remediation actions.  The investigative or “watchdog” approach taken by these groups 
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and their direct interactions with both Serbs and Kosovar Albanians who are not 
associated with agencies from either government contribute greatly to the value of the 
publications.  This characteristic is especially relevant when examining events such as the 
March 2004 riots during which Serbs complained of “reverse ethnic cleansing.”41  Other 
NGOs such as policy review think tanks also contribute to the discussion through 
position papers and policy analyses.   
A salient treatment of the institutional approach is provided by Anne-Marie 
Gardner.  Gardner builds upon the legitimacy issue discussed above by proposing that 
individual states and international organizations such as the UN respond more favorably 
to sub-state groups’ claims to self-determination when those groups conform to Western 
standards such as “human rights and democratic norms.”42  In Gardner’s view, 
recognition of Kosovo’s declaration of independence is a function of the Kosovar 
government’s demonstration of its commitment to institutions and its capacity for 
governance. 
Additional clues for evaluating the institutional and systemic explanations can be 
found in UN and NATO official texts, including the series of Security Council 
resolutions that preceded and followed NATO’s military campaign and the charter 
documents for UNMIK and KFOR.  Alexandros Yannis, a close political advisor to the 
first head of UNMIK, French diplomat and physician Bernard Kouchner, provides an 
insider’s view of UNMIK’s early successes and struggles—as well as its remaining 
challenges—in his 2000 work Kosovo under International Administration: An Unfinished 
Conflict.43  The UN and NATO have released regular updates and periodic reports, at 
both their headquarters level and through their Kosovo operations, that track actual 
progress against proposed goals.  Comparing these reports with publications from the 
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previously-mentioned NGO watchdog groups often proves useful for evaluating both the 
institutional and systemic explanations for Kosovo’s independence.  
Official government documents from Belgrade, Washington, Moscow, and the 
capitals of Europe are also instructive for discerning the interests, intentions, and 
motivations of the member governments supporting the Kosovo intervention.  
Specifically, reports from different agencies within the same national government can 
help reveal policies that may be at cross-purposes.  For example, the United States, as an 
influential permanent member of the UN Security Council, ostensibly supported the 
“standards before status” approach adopted for Kosovo; yet a House of Representatives 
hearing on Kosovo’s declaration of independence observes that “[a]s long as Kosovo’s 
final status remained unresolved, businesses were reluctant to invest there, and 
international financial institutions were unable to offer the needed monetary 
assistance."44   Such observations speak to potential disconnects between policy goals 
and the effects of policy implementation. 
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The remainder of this study is divided into four additional chapters.  Chapter II 
will examine the historical explanation proposed above.  This chapter provides a 
historical overview that will explore Kosovo’s significance in Serbian history.  It will 
trace the evolution of the Serbs as a nation and Serbia as a state, from the ancient Serb 
Dynasties through the Ottoman occupation, twentieth century wars, and the creation and 
disintegration of Yugoslavia.  It will also examine the ethnic Albanian experience in 
Kosovo and historical trends in Serb-Albanian relations there.  Finally, it will then 
evaluate the plausibility of the historical explanation. 
Chapter III will inspect the institutional explanation.  It will do so by first 
examining the competing principles that framed the debate over intervention—a debate 
that dominated various international venues from the summer of 1998 to the spring of 
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1999—as well as the discussion on how to proceed with governing Kosovo once the 
debate over intervention was obviated by the NATO military action.  It will then examine 
the “standards before status” criteria by which UNMIK and its partner administrative 
organizations gauged Kosovo’s readiness for independence.  Finally, it will evaluate the 
extent to which such criteria were met by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government 
(PISG) when the Kosovo Assembly declared independence. 
Chapter IV will scrutinize the systemic explanation for Kosovo’s independence.  
To this end, it will investigate the perceptions and motivations of which the main actors 
at the state and international level were possessed, as well as their respective approaches 
to administering Kosovo.  It will also evaluate the actual implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1244, again focusing on the UN’s “standards before status” approach 
and its effectiveness in engaging both Serbian and Kosovar Albanian leaders in a 
constructive dialogue regarding Kosovo’s future.  In addition, it will examine the efficacy 
of UNMIK and KFOR in fulfilling the resolution’s provisions.  Finally, it will explore the 
anti-Serb riots of March 2004—a defining moment in post-Allied Force Serb-Albanian 
relations that irreparably severed Serbian faith in the ability of the UN, EU, OSCE, 
NATO, and other international organizations to equitably represent Serb interests and 
fairly broker Kosovo’s future status. 
Chapter V will summarize the findings of this study.  It will draw conclusions and 
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II. BAD BLOOD:  A HISTORICAL EXPLANATION 
A. BACKGROUND:  KINGS, PRINCES, SAINTS, AND MARTYRS 
1. History’s Contours 
The present situation in Kosovo cannot be fully understood, much less analyzed, 
without an at least cursory appreciation of the region’s past.  Balkan history is perhaps 
best understood in terms of geography, and that of Serbia and Kosovo is no exception.  
Mazower devotes much of the first chapter of his The Balkans: A Short History to 
describing the region’s terrain, following the precedent set by Fernand Braudel 30 years 
earlier in the opening chapter of his two-volume work on the Mediterranean Realm of 
Spanish Monarch Philip II’s Holy Roman Empire:  “Mountains come first.”45  Through, 
and on rare occasion across, these mountain-lined channels would ebb and flow of 
migration, imperial invasion and decline, and military incursion and retreat.46   
Ruled in turn by Ancient Greece, Rome, and Constantinople (first under the 
Byzantine Empire and then the Ottoman Turks), the Slavic races of the Balkans were 
constantly in motion, their boundaries changing like the contours of the beach under the 
force of incoming waves, the fringes of their populations scattered into diasporas like the 
ocean-born detritus deposited at the water’s edge.  The rugged karst topology also tended 
to isolate regions within the peninsula from each other, so that, for example, “Dubrovnik 
[on the Dalmatian Coast] ... has had closer ties for much of its history with Venice than 
with Belgrade.”47  Thus, as the Slavic peoples who first appeared south of the Danube in 
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the sixth century A.D.48 spread throughout the peninsula, they began to speak different 
dialects of the same root and develop their own distinct cultures. 
2. Dynastic Serbia, the Ottoman Empire, and the Cult of Prince Lazar 
Serbia’s earliest experiences as a kingdom demonstrate the deep intertwining of 
authority with religion in the region.  Stephen Nemanjić, crowned “king of all Serbia” in 
1217, was the brother of Sava, the first archbishop of the newly-autocephalous Serbian 
Orthodox Church.49  Stephen played the political game well, playing rivals off of each 
other while maintaining ties with Rome as well as Byzantium, while Sava was firmly 
grounded in the Orthodox East.50  Nevertheless, the brothers provided each other with 
mutual support, and so “[t]he connexion between dynasty and church contributed to 
binding the Nemanjić lands.”51  An important product of the close ties between throne 
and archbishopric was the rise of the cult of dynastic saints.52  
The most notable such saint to bear the Nemanjić mantle was Prince Lazar 
Hrebeljanović.  Although his domain was much reduced from that of Serbia’s apex under 
King Stefan Dušan,53 his death at the battle of Kosovo Polje, the “Field of Blackbirds,” 
forever cemented his legacy—as well as Kosovo’s—in Serbian history.54  While most 
historians agree Serbian tales of the battle are grounded only partially in fact,55 the 
resulting “Cult of Lazar” nevertheless became deeply embedded in the Serb psyche.  
Legend offered up the tale of the Prophet Elijah, flying from Jerusalem in the guise of a 
falcon, bearing a message from the Virgin Mary: 
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Of what kind will you have your kingdom? 
Do you want a heavenly kingdom? 
Do you want an earthly kingdom?56 
Lazar, according to the legend, chose the former, and the fallen prince made his way 
through Orthodox panegyrics into sainthood:  “Lazar’s death was thus seen as a martyr’s 
sacrifice for the Christian faith, and one that established a new link with Heaven.”57  This 
“new link” was anchored, quite literally, in the plains of Kosovo. 
3. Under the “Ottoman Yoke”: The Ottomans Advance, Lazar Retreats, 
and the Kosovar Albanians Descend 
As the Serbs pushed north during the middle of the sixteenth century in the face 
of inexorable Ottoman gains up the Balkan Peninsula, they left open the lowlands of 
Kosovo.  These lowlands were subsequently occupied by the mountain-dwelling 
Albanians from the southwest,58 most of whom had converted to Islam and thus had less 
to fear from the ruling Ottomans.  The following observation from Pavlowitch may well 
describe the root cause of the geopolitical dilemma that bedevils Serbia-Albanian 
relations in Kosovo:   
The Serbian Realm had been a shifting one, moving from eastern Bosnia 
in the west to Macedonia and further southeast, and then again from south 
to north, as the power of Byzantium oscillated, as its Bulgarian rival rose 
and fell, and as the Ottoman Turks advanced ....59 
Kaplan picks up this thread of logic by way of a medical analogy.  He describes 
“conflicting dreams of lost imperial glory” as the “principle illness of the Balkans.”60  
Thus, if Pavlowitch’s shifting borders are the pathogen, then the symptom, according to 
Kaplan, is that “[e]ach nation demands that its borders revert to where they were at the 
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exact time when its own empire had reached its zenith of ancient medieval expansion.”61  
Such competing historical narratives, founded in the geographic and cultural 
displacement of the conquered by the conqueror, were woven into the Balkan social 
fabric.  In time the Ottoman occupation of Christian lands within Europe became known 
as the “Ottoman yoke.”62   
Some of the Serbs who remained in Kosovo were not only Islamized but also 
Albanianized by the Ottomans.63  However, although deserted in large part by its 
erstwhile Serb occupants, Kosovo remained home to the many medieval Orthodox 
monasteries that dotted its bucolic countryside, with their inspiring centuries-old murals 
and the relics of Orthodox saints, including Lazar’s.  Kaplan adopts the “crowd symbol” 
methodology of Elias Canetti, a native Hungarian,64 to help focus his treatment of Serb-
Albanian antagonism within Kosovo. Crowd symbols are a type of metaphorical 
shorthand for a nation’s historical narrative:  the sea for the English, the army—the 
“marching forest”—for the Germans, the revolution for the French, and the Exodus from 
Egypt for the Jews.65  Kaplan asserts the Serbs have two such symbols:  the medieval 
monasteries of “Old Serbia” (Kosovo), and Kosovo Polje, the field where Lazar fell in 
battle in 1389.66  By adopting these crowd symbols, the Serbs retained their spiritual link 
to Kosovo despite having departed the province physically. 
After the Ottomans repulsed a late seventeenth-century assault by the combined 
forces of Austria, Poland, and Venice, the monks of Lazar’s foundation fled to Belgrade, 
bringing his relics with them.67  As the Cult of Lazar took root in its new home, it 
became intimately associated with “Old Serbia”:  “The emotional attachment of those 
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who had left, and thus lost, Kosovo fed in to the epic legend.”68  This sentiment also 
grew among Orthodox Serbs still living in nearby Montenegro.69   
In a manner of speaking, then, the Balkan region’s ethnic contours became a 
geopolitical reflection of the physical contours that helped shape the face of language, 
culture, and religion.  This holds true not only literally, in the form of the limestone 
blocks used to build monastery and mosque alike; it also holds true in a deeper sense, in 
that the mountains from which the limestone was quarried provided the channel through 
which the Islam of the Ottomans displaced the Orthodoxy of the Serbs in the Kosovo 
lowlands, and in doing so set the stage for the bitter conflict centuries later that would 
ultimately lead to Kosovo’s independence. 
B. SERBIA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
1. Kosovo, Gained and Lost 
Serbia gained formal independence from the tottering Ottoman Empire in 1878,70 
but its freedom was a bittersweet one:  it did not count Kosovo among its holdings.  
Falling still within the oppressive shadow of the Catholic-dominated Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, Orthodox Serbia bid its time and husbanded its strength.  Its involuntary patience 
was rewarded in 1912 when it joined the Balkan League, an alliance of convenience 
formed with Russian encouragement as a foil to Vienna71—which had aroused Russian 
ire by annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina72—but which instead set about driving the 
remaining Ottoman forces from Europe.  Pavlowitch makes clear the influence of the 
Cult of Lazar: 
The realization that Kosovo could finally be liberated and avenged fired 
the conscripts’ imagination.  “Kosovo” had by then become a complex 
whole interweaving several elements—the battle which symbolized the 
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end of medieval Serbia and the beginning of Turkish domination, the 
religious values of martyrdom and hope, and the territory of what had 
come to be called “Old Serbia.”73 
Perhaps predictably, Serb forces committed numerous atrocities against the Muslim, 
ethnic-Albanian population of Kosovo,74 which understandably embittered the residents 
who had for centuries called the province home.75 
Serbia had regained Kosovo, but its hold on the province throughout the ensuing 
century would be tenuous.  As mentioned in Chapter I, the province was given to Albania 
during World War I.  “‘Every [Serbian] peasant soldier knows what he is fighting for,’ 
noted [journalist] John Reed, at the front in World War I.  ‘When he was a baby, his 
mother greeted him, “Hail, little avenger of Kossovo!”’”76  Reclaiming Kosovo at war’s 
end, Serbia, now part of the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, embarked 
on a campaign of resettlement aimed at reclaiming the province demographically77—a 
venture whose failure was lamented by the polemic Dr. Čubrilović.78  “The only way and 
the only means to cope with [the Kosovar Albanians] is the use of the brutal force by an 
organized state,” Čubrilović unapologetically wrote.79  Disparaging previous attempts to 
“[resolve the] immense ethnic problem” using “Western methods,”80 Čubrilović 
advocated mass, forced emigration similar to that mandated by the 1923 peace treaty 
between Greece and Turkey.81   
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After the Second World War—which, within the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes was essentially a bloody civil war82—Marshal Tito cobbled the kingdom’s 
ethnic republics together to form Yugoslavia, a Communist state that from outside looked 
much like its pre-war predecessor.  Tito sought to eventually include Albania in his 
federation and used Kosovo as his bargaining chip.83  Since Kosovar Albanians were 
viewed as “counter-revolutionaries” with little desire to rejoin with Yugoslavia,84 Tito 
made Kosovo an autonomous region of Serbia85 instead of making it its own separate 
republic.  In the interim, he thwarted Serb and Kosovar Albanian ambitions alike 
(although he may have believed he was reconciling them instead86):  Kosovo would 
remain part of Serbia—as opposed to being a separate republic within the Yugoslav 
Federation—but it would be an autonomous province.87  Although Serb-Albanian 
tensions there would continue to simmer, Tito’s strongman approach would keep them in 
check for the next 35 years. 
2. “Balkan West Bank”: The Rise of Nationalism, the Collapse of 
Yugoslavia, and the Return of Lazar 
Yugoslavia survived for a decade after Tito’s death in 1980.  Its disintegration in 
the early 1990s followed the collapse of Communism elsewhere in Eastern Europe, but 
the seeds of its particular brand of destruction had been sown decades—if not centuries—
earlier.  Ultra-nationalists such as Slobodan Milošević in Belgrade and Franjo Tudjman 
in Zagreb rode waves of nationalistic sentiment to the zenith of political power and 
proceeded to dismember with bloody ferocity the federation Tito had constructed.  
Milošević often invoked the memory of medieval Kosovo to stir up Serbian ire.  In a 
statement reminiscent of Kaplan’s description of Serbia’s “crowd symbols,” Milošević  
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once told his Serb audience, “‘Every nation has a love which eternally warms its heart ... 
[f]or Serbia it is Kosovo.’”88  Appropriately, the chapter in which Kaplan makes his 
remarks bears the subtitle, “Balkan ‘West Bank.’”    
Milošević also harnessed the powerful image of Prince Lazar as part of a 
carefully-crafted strategy to solidify his Serbian base.  Three hundred years after his 
relics were whisked to Belgrade by fleeing monks—and one year after Milošević had told 
a crowd of defiant Serbs in Kosovo, “no one should dare to beat you”89—Lazar made a 
triumphant return to Kosovo.  Over the course of the year leading up to the 600th 
anniversary of his martyrdom, he made a sort of posthumous victory lap around the 
province.90  Kaplan described the martyr’s reception: 
The throngs of shrieking mourners surrounding his wooden coffin 
resembled mourners at the bier of the Imam Husain, [who was] massacred 
... by the Sunni armies of Yazid.  Like the Shiites, unreconstructed Serbs 
... granted no legitimacy to their temporal rulers, whether Ottoman Turks 
or Yugoslav Communists.  In this way, they ignored their physical world.  
They knew that, one day soon, [Prince] Lazar in heaven would reclaim 
what was rightfully his on earth.91 
Despite the six centuries since their hero’s martyrdom and the three centuries since his 
hasty, inglorious departure, Kosovo’s Serbs faithfully welcomed their sainted prince. 
3. Yugoslavia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Kosova 
Prospects for the Kosovar Albanians dimmed as Milošević’s political fortunes 
brightened.  Although they had enjoyed improvements in income, quality of life, and 
civic governance in the late 1980s, Milošević’s campaign of systematic civic and 
economic discrimination reversed those gains.92  The most odious example of these 
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policies was the “1990 Labor Act for Extraordinary Circumstances,” under which almost 
150,000 ethnic Albanians in Kosovo were dismissed from public sector positions.93  Civil 
disobedience in the form of demonstrations and strikes resulted in violent clashes with 
police.94   
This period was marked by rising interest in secession among the Kosovar 
Albanians.  A 1990 referendum for independence, although illegal in Belgrade’s eyes and 
boycotted by Kosovo’s Serbs, received 99 percent approval.95 Support for Dr. Ibrahim 
Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo (or LDK, after its Albanian name Lidhja 
Demokratike e Kosovës) grew rapidly.96  Rugova envisioned a three-plank platform:  
preventing a war of secession, garnering international attention and support for Kosovo’s 
plight, and delegitimizing Serbian rule within Kosovo by means of civil disobedience and 
installation of a parallel government.97 
Yannis describes “three critical moments in the recent history of Kosovo that 
transformed the political dispute between Kosovo Albanians and Yugoslavia into an open 
liberation and secessionist war.”98  The first was Milošević’s effective rescinding of the 
autonomy Tito granted Kosovo in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution; the second was the 
successful, if costly, secessions of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
Macedonia; and the third—and perhaps, most damning—was the failure of the Dayton 
Peace accords to include provisions for Kosovo’s feature.99  On the last of these 
elements, Yannis suggests the Kosovar Albanians learned the same lesson the Serbs had a 
century before at the Congress of Berlin:  a nation’s ability to make change by force of 
arms has far greater efficacy than the patronage of “Great Power” sponsors.100 
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It was to be a lesson well learned.  After the 1995 Dayton Accords, only Serbia 
(including Kosovo) and Montenegro remained in “rump Yugoslavia.”  (Montenegro 
would declare independence in 2006.)  Although Rugova’s LDK shadow government 
was functioning effectively, his failure to garner international support and involvement 
caused popular support among Kosovar Albanians to shift from the LDK to the emerging 
Kosovo Liberation Army101 (KLA, or UÇK after its Albanian name, Ushtria Çlirimtare e 
Kosovës).  Following, classical insurgent doctrine, the KLA embarked on a campaign of 
insurgency.102  A pattern of brutal tit-for-tat followed, with KLA provocations bringing 
heavy-handed Serb reprisals and vice-versa.  Eventually Belgrade would use KLA 
actions as justification to launch what it termed counterterrorism missions throughout 
Kosovo.  As these missions grew in scope, they led to charges of ethnic cleansing, which 
led to NATO’s initiation of Allied Force.  In the end Rugova got what he wanted:  the 
Kosovo issue became internationalized.  Just over six months after Allied Force ended, 
senior Hoover Institution fellow Timothy Garton Ash wrote, “Thanks to us, Kosova ends 
with an a—the Albanian as opposed to the Serbian spelling.”103 
C. EVALUATING THE HISTORICAL EXPLANATION 
Although the preceding passages make clear the competing narratives and goals 
of Kosovo’s Albanians and their Serbian neighbors, they do not tell the complete story.  
They represent fact, but not necessarily a complete truth.  It requires little effort to 
imagine the Serb-Albanian dynamic within Kosovo as a natural antagonism born of race, 
tongue, and creed:  Slavic against Illyrian, Serbo-Croatian against Albanian, and above 
all Orthodox Christianity against Ottoman Islam.  It is not altogether unsurprising that 
both the UN’s Special Representative to the Secretary-General and the commander of 
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KFOR agreed that “[t]he violence can be explained by hatred accumulated over 
centuries,”104 despite this assertion from historian Noel Malcolm:   
There have been many battles and wars in Kosovo over the centuries, but 
until the last 100 years or so none of them had the character of an 'ethnic' 
conflict between Albanians and Serbs. Members of those two populations 
fought together as allies at the battle of Kosovo in 1389—indeed, they 
probably fought as allies on both sides of that battle.105 
There is no doubt some historical enmity exists between Kosovo’s Albanian and Serb 
populations, but to accept Kosovo’s independence as the inevitable product of this enmity 
is to make assumptions about its origins and nature.   
Consider, for example, this series of passages from Kaplan as he recounts his 
conversation with a Serbian Orthodox nun, Mother Tatiana, in a Kosovo monastery: 
Mother Tatiana did not hint, therefore:  “We would have been even greater 
than the Italians, were it not for the Turks.”  That was the refrain you 
heard throughout the Balkans....  Dame Rebecca [West] writes:  “The 
Turks ruined the Balkans, with a ruin so great that it has not yet been 
repaired....”  
.... For decades, prostrate under Tito, Mother Tatiana had other worries, 
other battles to fight.  But with that plague ending, she was back to 
fighting the Turks, although she now called the problem by another 
name.106 
Mother Tatiana’s grievance continues a few pages later: 
“I have remained inside these [monastery] walls for thirty-five years.... In 
1539, there was a printing press here.  Out there,” lifting her hand, “it is 
all dirty and uncared for.”  Out there is ... what Mother Tatiana now called 
“Old Serbia” [Kosovo]....   In recent decades ... this hallowed ground has 
been demographically reclaimed, not by the Turks, but by their historical 
appendants, the Muslim Albanians.107 
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Kaplan offers such anecdotes as evidence of a deeply ingrained, mutual animosity 
between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians.  When coupled with the passage quoted in 
Chapter I (“‘Here we are completely submerged in our history,’”)108 such excerpts speak 
to a perceived inability to escape the past:  coexistence between the Serbs and Albanians 
is impossible because the latter represent modern reminders of the “Turkish yoke.”  
Couched in such terms, ethnic strife in Kosovo takes on a quality of inevitability, even 
`inexorability.  As Mother Tatiana presciently told Kaplan a decade before Allied Force, 
“‘Things will get worse between us and the Albanians—you’ll see.  There can be no 
reconciliation.’”109 
A closer inspection of the historical record from which this narrative emerges 
reveals a more complete truth.  Pavlowitch points out that the concept of a “Serbian 
ethnic consciousness” appeared only after the Ottoman conquest of the Balkan Peninsula 
temporarily halted the internecine territorial squabbles between the various Slavic tribes 
there.110  For example, the millet system by which the Ottomans delegated daily rule of 
their Christian subjects to the Orthodox hierarchy111 benefited the Serbian church, 
allowing it to “[provide] a major ingredient for the elaboration of a common [Serb] ethnic 
identity.”112  In a sense, then, the emergence of the Serbs as a nation is at least indirectly 
a product of the Ottoman incursion into Europe. 
Although Muslims occupied a higher legal status in Ottoman society than 
Christians or Jews, overall the Ottomans were more tolerant of other religions than their 
European Christian counterparts.113  Forced conversions to Islam were comparatively 
rare,114 although many Christians converted to Islam to escape the societal and economic 
burdens imposed on non-Muslims.115  As a result, the region remained decidedly 
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heterogeneous compared to the rest of Europe.  Mosques sprang up next to churches, 
while Christians, Jews, and Muslims lived side-by-side.116 Mazower devotes lengthy 
passages to the common practice of various religious groups borrowing each others’ 
customs.117  Such accounts of mundane multi-confessional coexistence contradict the 
notion that Serb-Albanian relations were dominated historically by “ancient hatreds.” 118 
Scholar Isa Blumi also refutes the historical explanation’s main premise that 
“ancient hatreds” and memories of the “Ottoman yoke” created an atmosphere so divisive 
that “there [could] be no reconciliation.”  Blumi takes issue with Kaplan’s “excessively 
gloomy descriptions”119 and opposes as reductionist Kaplan’s portrayal of the Balkans 
region.  Lamenting what he terms “the marginalization of historical cognition,”120 Blumi 
soundly rejects the binary, monolithic terms in which the Kosovo conflict has been 
cast.121  Returning to this message in a later chapter, Blumi notes: 
[D]espite their seemingly irreconcilable differences, Christians and 
Muslims, Slavs and Albanians, maintained integrated social and economic 
lives that confounded, at least initially, [nineteenth-century] Ottoman, 
Austrian and Russian efforts to assert influence....   How this translates 
over time has a great deal of value in arguing against the assertions 
present-day historians of the Balkans make about inter-communal 
relations.122 
This observation corroborates Mazower’s description of multi-confessional coexistence. 
Like Blumi, Malcolm also impugns the historical explanation’s underlying 
premises and explanatory power.  As he asserts in his introduction to Kosovo: A Short 
History:   
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[O]nce we begin to examine both the present political situation and the 
nature of Kosovo’s past, the idea of ethnic or religious hatred welling up 
from the depths of popular psychology starts to seem less convincing.123 
Echoing the Mazower and Blumi’s observations regarding multi-confessional rapport, 
Malcolm recounts “examples of mixed religious life involving the Orthodox as well as 
the Catholics with the Muslims:  the syncretistic practices of folk religion ... or the 
tradition of Muslim Albanian ‘guardians’ of Orthodox religious sites.”124  He carefully 
traces the history of the Cult of Lazar, noting prominent discontinuities in the celebration 
of the martyr’s feast day between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries.125  Of particular 
significance is Malcolm’s attribution of the nineteenth-century revival in the cult’s 
popularity to no less than nineteenth-century linguist and author Vuk Karadžić.  
According to George White, Karadžić advanced the accretion of the Serb national 
identity during the twilight years of Ottoman power in Southeast Europe by promoting a 
standardized version of the Serbian language.126  Wachtel notes Karadžić “almost single-
handedly created a Serbian literary language,” in the belief it could help “forge a Serb 
identity that could cross class and religious lines.”127  The implication for Serb identity is 
that its Lazarian historical narrative, like its language, is at least a partially constructed 
phenomenon—and such construction took place much closer to present day than to the 
year of Lazar’s death.  It should be noted that Karadžić’s concept of the Serb identity was 
an inclusive one that included Serb-speaking Muslims.128  Clearly the same cannot be 
said for Slobodan Milošević, who sought to manipulate Karadžić’s constructs for his own 
political gain. 
Although such observations do not negate existing evidence of historical tensions 
between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians,129 they broaden the context within which such 
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evidence must be considered.  Revealing purported “ancient hatreds” as part skewed 
misrepresentation of the historical record and part constructed narrative originating only 
in the century prior to Kosovo’s independence greatly undermines the historical 
explanation by robbing it of its agency.  In other words, ethnic and religious antagonism, 
although having some basis in fact, was exploited by political actors on both sides of the 
Kosovo crisis in order to advance political goals.  Malcolm’s observation about the 
Bosnian conflict also holds true for Kosovo:  “But between low-level prejudices on the 
one hand and military conflict ... on the other, there lies a very long road:  it was the 
political leaders who propelled the people down that road, and not vice-versa.”130  And 
had the Serbs not oppressed Kosovo’s Albanians as part of Milošević’s nationalistic 
agenda—first through civic disenfranchisement and then through physical violence, both 
perpetrated by political leadership—it is likely Kosovo would still be part of Serbia 
today.  The most that can be said about the historical explanation is that its exploitation 
by the Serbs provided motive to the Kosovar Albanians to pursue secession.  The null 
hypothesis is thus demonstrated to be false.  While this explanation describes a necessary 
condition for Kosovo’s independence, it alone is not sufficient to explain how Kosovo 
was able to achieve that independence. 
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III. GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE COMPETING PRINCIPLES 
OF STATE-BUILDING:  AN INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Armed intervention is the most flagrant violation of a nation’s sovereignty, and 
the NATO military intervention in Kosovo was an extremely contentious event.  The 
issue is one of sovereignty:  as a rule, states do not forcibly interfere in the internal affairs 
of other states lest they invite such interference upon themselves.  Resolution 1244 
stipulated the UN presence in Kosovo would respect Yugoslavia’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity while simultaneously providing autonomy for the province.  
UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo, however, was technically a perpetuation of the 
sovereignty breach NATO had created, as the UNSG’s Special Envoy on Kosovo’s final 
status later acknowledged: 
In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council 
responded to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its 
governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations 
administration and envisaging a political process designed to determine 
Kosovo’s future. The combination of these factors makes Kosovo’s 
circumstances extraordinary.131 
Yannis invoked mythology to describe the foreboding task UNMIK faced, describing it 
as being forced to “navigate skillfully between the Scylla of independence and the 
Charybdis of Yugoslav sovereignty.”132  UNMIK was, in essence, charting new territory. 
Sovereignty is the basis on which states interact, but as a concept it is meaningful 
only by consensus.  Like rules of etiquette at a formal dinner, meaning is attached to 
“sovereignty” only by those who observe it.  Although the practice of intervening on 
behalf of at-risk civilians has gained acceptance in recent decades in the case of willing-
but-weak states unable to exercise governance, attacking a state whose government is the 
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source of oppression is still largely viewed as a dangerous precedent to be undertaken 
only as a last resort.  The Kosovo case, then, demonstrates of how the concept of 
sovereignty is subject to redefinition. 
If the meaning of sovereignty can be altered, by what methods, and according to 
what criteria, does such alteration occur?  This chapter explores the processes by which 
sovereignty is given meaning.  It asserts that rather than having one mutually-agreed to 
definition, sovereignty instead can be considered an “essentially contested concept.”133  It 
then examines a specific redefinition of sovereignty as a function of governance.  This 
examination is particularly relevant to the case of Kosovo because the UNMIK-created 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) represent a test case for such a 
definition.  If one accepts that sovereignty is subject to redefinition, and that a new 
definition in terms of governance is valid, then it follows that UNMIK’s implementation 
of the PISG created the basis for recognition of a new, sovereign entity within Kosovo. 
B. COMPETING PRINCIPLES:  SOVEREIGNTY 
1. Sovereign States 
The state is the basic building block of the current international system.  It is the 
dominant referent object—the primary “currency,” in a sense, in which the international 
relations theorist plies his or her trade.  In his groundbreaking work International Law, 
Lassa Oppenheim wrote that a state “is in existence when a people is settled in a country 
under its own Sovereign Government.”134  Oppenheim continued by parsing out the four 
components of his definition:  the people, “who live together as a community”; the 
country, or the physical geographic region “in which the people has settled down”; the 
Government, composed of “representatives of the people” who “rule according to the law 
of the land”; and finally the condition the government be Sovereign, which Oppenheim 
defined as “supreme authority, an authority which is independent of any other earthly 
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authority.”135  Oppenheim clearly influenced the drafters of the 1933 Montevideo 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States, which declares in its Article I: 
The State as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications:  (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory;  
(c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other 
states.136 
Regarding Oppenheim’s last component of “supreme authority,” Max Weber 
elaborated that a state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”137  Oppenheim’s use of 
“earthly authority” and Weber’s invocation of “the legitimate use of force” highlight 
elements important to the evolution of sovereignty as a concept, for as the following 
passages will make clear, it is only recently, relatively speaking, that sovereignty has not 
been predicated on the notion of divine authority—in the absence of which the use of 
force was deemed decidedly illegitimate. 
2. Sovereignty:  The Westphalian System? 
The concept of state sovereignty is widely associated with the Peace of 
Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years’ War in Europe: 
Sovereignty, as a concept, formed the cornerstone of the edifice of 
international relations that 1648 raised up.  Sovereignty was the crucial 
element in the peace treaties of Westphalia, the international agreements 
that were intended to end a great war and to promote a coming peace.138 
“Sovereignty” as a concept was first introduced into academic discourse by Jean Bodel 
seven decades before Westphalia,139 and expanded upon by Emer de Vattel eleven 
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decades after.140  In the millennium preceding Westphalia, Church, Empire, and 
principality had competed for power within a complex hierarchy.  The Roman Catholic 
Church and the Holy Roman Empire had been the main seats of European authority since 
the fifth-century “two swords” doctrine of Pope Gelasius I.141  Gelasius envisioned the 
“secular sword,” regnum, as wielded by the emperor—at the time, Anastisius—while the 
pope himself held the more authoritative “sacred sword,” sacerdotium, in accordance 
with Christ’s conferral upon Saint Peter the power to “bind and loose”142—divine 
authority over the legitimate use of force, indeed.   
The Westphalia accords “legitimated the right of sovereigns to govern their 
peoples free of outside interference, whether any such external claim to interfere was 
based on political, legal or religious principles.”143  Whether the accords actually 
established the modern nation-state is the subject of debate; scholar Stephen Krasner, for 
example, contends “Westphalia was first and foremost a new constitution for the Holy 
Roman Empire.”  Conversely, Stéphane Beaulac asserts that by rendering all states equal 
in legal stature among their peers, the Peace of Westphalia formed the basis for modern 
international law that has prevailed for over three centuries.144  Regardless of 
sovereignty’s true origins, its role in modern international relations remains preeminent:  
when constructing the UN after World War II, the major powers explicitly predicated the 
organization’s existence on “the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members.”145  This article would become the focus of intense debate as the members of 
the international community sought a unified approach for responding to the crisis in 
Kosovo. 
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3. Dimensions of Sovereignty 
Beaulac described internal and external dimensions to sovereignty.146  The 
internal dimension concerns the government’s right to deal with domestic affairs, while 
the external dimension concerns its ability to interact with other states on equal legal 
footing.  Thus, Weber was referring to sovereignty’s internal dimension in his definition 
of the state provided above. 
The concept of sovereignty and its two dimensions is particularly germane to the 
case of Kosovo and Serbia.  Over the course of five Security Council resolutions issued 
throughout the Kosovo crisis, from March of 1998 through June of 1999, the United 
Nations consistently reaffirmed “the commitment of all Member States” to respect 
Yugoslavia’s sovereignty.147  But to which dimension of sovereignty was the Security 
Council referring?  Those states advocating intervention under the aegis of UN Charter 
Article VII, which addresses the UN’s responsibilities in countering “acts of 
aggression,”148 were focusing primarily on the external dimension, while those 
expressing reservations or outright objections were grounded in the internal dimension.  
This debate reflected an ongoing wider discussion within both academic and political 
milieus. 
4. Sovereignty as an “Essentially Contested Concept” 
While it is true that sovereignty has served as “the cornerstone of international 
rhetoric about state independence and freedom of action,”149 over the preceding century 
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scholars have increasingly sought to revisit the Westphalian concept of sovereignty.  In 
1956 scholar W.B. Gallie introduced the concept of the “essentially contested concept,” 
by which he asserted some concepts—such as art, democracy, or Christian tradition—are 
subject to competing definitions by different groups, each using different terms in order 
to support its respective position or point of view.150  Gallie offered discrete criteria for 
determining whether a concept is “essentially contested,”151 asserting in summary, “to 
use an essentially contested concept means to use it against other uses and to recognize 
that one's own use of it has to be maintained against these other uses.”152 
Considerable evidence exists that “sovereignty” is an essentially-contested 
concept; recalling Gallie’s above summary, for instance, may explain why “the most 
common response to initiatives that seek to limit a state’s action is that such initiatives 
constitute an impermissible limitation on that state’s sovereignty.”153  Writing a half-
century before Gallie, Oppenheim opined: 
[T]here exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is more 
controversial than that of sovereignty.  It is an indisputable fact that this 
conception, from the moment when it was introduced into political science 
until the present day has never had a meaning which was universally 
agreed upon.154 
In the 1955 Eighth Edition to Oppenheim’s seminal work, Hersch Lauterpacht (the then-
late Oppenheim’s colleague and editor) acknowledged the challenges to sovereignty that 
had emerged after two World Wars: 
The question which is now confronting the science of law and politics is 
how far sovereignty as it presents itself from the point of view of the 




                                                 
150 Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” 168. 
151 Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” 171–2. 
152 Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” 172. 
153 Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, 14. 
154 Oppenheim, International Law, 1:103, quoted in Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-
Determination, 14. 
 39
the exclusive competence to determine its jurisdictional limits, is 
compatible with the normal functioning and development of International 
Law and organization.155 
Here Lauterpacht, whose words could easily have been written in the summer of 1998, is 
clearly addressing tensions between sovereignty’s internal dimension (“the internal law 
of the State”) and its external one (“International Law”). 
Beaulac makes use of the meta-linguistic device known as “Ogden & Richards’ 
Triangle”156 to describe language formation informs the present discussion (Figure 1.)  
The triangle’s three vertices are the symbol, the thought or reference, and the referent.  
The symbol is a word:  a unique element of a given lexicon.157  The thought or reference 
is the intangible, mental concept with which the symbol is associated; this concept exists 
solely within the realm of human thought.158  The referent is the actual object—concrete 
or abstract, tangible or ethereal—which the symbol seeks to describe.159 
 
Figure 1.   Ogden & Richard’s Triangle (from Beaulac, Power, 22.) 
The two sides of the triangle that terminate at the thought or reference vertex are solid 
because a direct relationship exists between this vertex and the symbol and referent 
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vertices, respectively.  For example, when one holds a baseball (the referent), one 
generates a mental representation of the ball (the thought or referent) while 
simultaneously saying (or thinking) the word, “baseball” (the symbol.)  The side 
connecting the symbol and referent vertices, however, is drawn with a broken line; as 
Beaulac observes, “words and reality are not connected directly, but only indirectly 
around the two sides of the triangle, that is, through the cognitive process.”160  Thus, a 
one-to-many or many-to-one mapping of symbol to referent may apply.  For example, a 
referent that would map to the symbol “soccer ball” in the United States would instead 
map to the symbol “football” in the rest of the world; conversely, outside the United 
States the symbol “football” would map to a spherical referent in a leather livery of black 
pentagons bordered by white hexagons, while within it would map to a prolate spheroid 
referent bound in brown pigskin. 
Applying Beaulac’s methodology to the referent of “sovereignty” reveals the 
linguistic mechanics of its essentially-contested nature:  while the symbol vertex is fixed, 
the referent and thought or reference vertices—what sovereignty actually is, and how one 
mentally represents it, respectively—are not.  Joseph Camilleri describes three 
approaches to contesting the dominant concept of sovereignty as a function of the state:  
divisible sovereignty, which involves “the sharing of legal power between the state ... a 
sub-state ... [,and/or] international institution[s];”161 relational sovereignty, “which seeks 
to connect the exercise of sovereign authority with—and in a sense makes it dependent 
upon—the satisfactory performance of certain functions;”162 and post-statist sovereignty, 
in which sovereignty rests not with the state but with “a plurality of groups, communities 
and associations, indeed in the disparate elements that comprise civil society.”163   
The preceding passages demonstrate that sovereignty is an “essentially contested 
concept;” that is, an ongoing intellectual debate exists which seeks to map the symbol 
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“sovereignty” to alternative referents via changes to the thought or reference.  The 
following passages will examine specific criteria, relevant to the present study of Serbia 
and Kosovo, by which changes to the thought or reference may occur.  The first passage 
describes how the concept of sovereignty may be circumscribed via competition with that 
of self-determination, while the second explores the juxtaposition of sovereignty’s 
divisible and relational variants with self-determination as applied to petitions for 
recognition by sub-state groups. 
C. COMPETING PRINCIPLES:  SELF-DETERMINATION 
Closely related to the concept of sovereignty—and often juxtaposed with it—is 
that of self-determination.  The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines this term as 
“determination by the people of a territorial unit of their own future political status.”164  
Scholar David Fromkin attributes the popularity of this phrase—and perhaps its 
etymology as well—to Woodrow Wilson.165  Describing self-determination as “‘an 
imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril,’”166 
President Wilson later heeded the warnings of his advisors and moderated his advocacy 
by stipulating application of this principle should not “‘[introduce] new or [perpetuate] 
old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely ... to break the peace’”—
which, as Fromkin points out, is exactly what self-determination does.167   
Fromkin’s observation speaks to an important disconnect:  the geographic 
boundaries of sovereignty’s political unit of measurement—the state—rarely align 
perfectly with those of the societies—the nations—which comprise state population.168  
(Recall that Oppenheim uses the terms “country” to describe the geo-political boundary 
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and “people” to describe the population that boundary inscribes.)169  A host of natural 
and man-made conditions, such as war, occupation, famine, disease, economic 
deprivation, and persecution, have made large expatriate and immigrant communities 
alike a common phenomenon.  Such was the case of Kosovo for the past 200 years,170 
where the ethnic Albanians were both a majority (within the province) and a minority 
(within greater Serbia.) 
What, then, is to be done when conflict arises between the state’s prerogatives 
under sovereignty, on the one hand, and a given segment of the population’s aspirations 
of self-determination on the other, as in the case of Serbia and Kosovo?  History and 
conventional wisdom alike have proven unkind to the latter.  The American Confederacy 
and Northern Ireland are but two notable examples of attempts at self-determination that 
were suppressed by force of arms.  An example that lends itself well to the Kosovo case 
is that of the Aaland Islands in the Baltic Sea.  Finland’s claim to the islands was 
reaffirmed upon its independence from Russia in 1917 despite the fact that, given the 
choice, most Aalanders would prefer to join with Sweden instead.171  Substituting 
Yugoslavia for Russia, Kosovo for the Aaland Islands, and Albania for Sweden generates 
a superficial analog to the present subject, but the two cases had remarkably dissimilar 
outcomes.  In considering the preferences of the Aalanders, the League of Nations valued 
sovereignty over self-determination: 
To concede to minorities, either of language or religion ... the right of 
withdrawing from the community to which they belong, because it is their 
wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy order and stability within 
States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be to uphold 
a theory incompatible with the very idea of the State as a territorial and 
political unity.172 
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Picking up this same thread after World War II, the UN considered self-
determination mainly within the narrow context of post-colonialism.173  Although the UN 
General Assembly adopted two international covenants on human rights in 1966 that 
asserted the right of self-determination of “all peoples,”174 Hannun notes that “most 
countries either have not specifically addressed [the article on self-determination] or have 
done so in such general terms that nothing is added to an understanding of its content.”175  
Although the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations stated “Every state has the duty to promote ... realization of the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination,” it also contained the reminder “The territorial integrity and 
political independence of the State are inviolable.”176  Considering Kosovo’s successful 
bid for independence, it is apparent that either the sovereignty/self-determination calculus 
itself, or the circumstances under which such calculus is applied, have changed in the 
interim. 
D. READY FOR STATEHOOD?  KOSOVO’S GOVERNANCE CAPACITY 
1. Charging the Conceptual Breach 
If sovereignty is indeed susceptible to redefinition, and if self-determination 
provides, at least notionally, a metaphysical lever for widening the resulting breach in the 
conception of sovereignty, what explanatory power does this conceptual change offer 
with regard to Kosovo’s independence?  Anne-Marie Gardner asserts that sub-state 
groups (such as the LDK) which claim to represent a specific segment of a state’s 
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population (such as the Kosovar Albanians) are held accountable to “international 
standards of democratic governance.”177  Gardner claims: 
When self-determination claimant groups have internalised human rights 
and democratic ideals, they are more likely to receive international support 
for their claim in the form of empowerment (efforts to acknowledge or 
promote self-governance).... Groups receive more international political 
support if they display the capacity for liberal democratic rule: 
representation, tolerance for minorities, and an emphasis on peaceful 
conflict resolution.178 
Gardner’s assertion combines Camilleri’s concepts of divisible and relational 
sovereignty.  Here sovereignty is divisible because it is shared between Serbia, the 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo, and the international community 
under the aegis of UNMIK.  It is relational because the degree to which the PISG’s 
sovereignty is recognized by external actors is a function of its governance capacity.  
This implies that UNMIK, EU, and OSCE efforts to build democratic, rule-of-law 
institutions within Kosovo increased the likelihood that Kosovo would eventually declare 
independence.  It also implies these efforts increased the likelihood that the member 
states most dominant in shaping the institution-building policy for administering Kosovo 
would recognize the province’s independence once declared.  If Gardner’s thesis is 
correct, then the earlier question concerning the weighing of sovereignty against self-
determination is answered, with the balance tipping in favor of the latter.  Provided the 
Kosovar Albanian leadership can be shown to have demonstrated sufficient governance 
capacity to merit recognition of Kosovo’s independence, this approach could serve as a 
basis for argument in support of the institutional explanation. 
2. Rebuilding Kosovo:  An Institutional Approach 
Under UNSCR 1244, UNMIK became the principle organization in a multi-
agency structure for administering Kosovo.  UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
appointed French Health Minister Bernard Kouchner as the Special Representative of the 
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Secretary-General (SRSG) in Kosovo.179  In this role, Kouchner was the senior UN 
official in Kosovo and was responsible for overall UNMIK operations.  UNMIK 
established a four-pillar construct divided into functional components.  Pillars 1 and 2, 
“Police and Justice” and “Civil Administration” respectively, were administered directly 
by UNMIK.180  The former included the Kosovo Police Service, an organic unit to 
supplement and eventually replace UNMIK’s international police presence known as 
CIVPOL.  Pillar 3, “Democracy and Institutions,” was led by OSCE, while Pillar 4, 
“Economic Development and Reconstruction,” fell under the EU.181  Security was 
provided by NATO’s KFOR in accordance with Resolution 1244.182  Russia, not wanting 
to abandon its Serb allies to the western alliance, also contributed troops.183   
UNMIK also created the PISG as an interim government consisting of executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches.184  PISG members were notionally elected by the 
Kosovo populace to represent their interests, but overall decision authority rested with the 
SRSG.185  This arrangement allowed an indigenous governing body to gain experience in 
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democratic governance and earn local credibility while avoiding the appearance that 
UNMIK was overtly positioning Kosovo for independence.  
3. Standards for Kosovo 
Fortunately for the purposes of this study, a mechanism for evaluating Kosovo’s 
progress in building its capacity for governance was provided by UNMIK in the form of 
“Standards for Kosovo.”186  Originally called “Standards before Status,”187 they consist 
of eight broad criteria categories based upon Western precepts of liberal democracy:  
implementing functioning democratic institutions and the rule of law; guaranteeing 
freedom of movement and rights returns and reintegration; reforming the economy; 
respecting property rights; constructing a dialogue with Belgrade; and constituting and 
maintaining the Kosovo Protection Corps.188  Following the March 2004 riots during 
which Kosovar Albanians attacked Serbs and other minorities within Kosovo, UNMIK 
issued a companion document for the standards, the Kosovo Standards Implementation 
Plan (KSIP,)189 which included a notional timeframe for implementing the standards. 
Various resources are available for evaluating the success of the “Standards for 
Kosovo” process and—by extension, according to Gardner’s premise—the feasibility of 
the institutional explanation for Kosovo’s independence.  As part of his duties as the 
senior UN official in Kosovo, the SRSG makes periodic reports on the progress of 
standards implementation.  Called “technical assessments,” these reports are, in essence, 
self-evaluations.  Independent evaluations from peer organizations such as the European 
Union are also available, as are critical analyses from non-governmental organizations.   
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E. MEETING STANDARDS?  EVALUATING THE INSTITUTIONAL 
EXPLANATION 
The most relevant time frame for evaluating the progress of standards 
implementation in Kosovo is the one immediately preceding the erstwhile province’s 
February 2008 declaration of independence.  UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
released in January 2008 what would be his final report on the interim administration 
mission in Kosovo before the declaration.  The report included as an appendix SRSG 
Joachim Rücker’s Technical Assessment of standards implementation.  Although the 
report laments the low voter turnout among Kosovo’s Serbs and their “[dependence] on 
parallel structures for the provision of basic services, which are supported by the 
authorities in Belgrade,”190 overall it strikes a positive tone.  It lists specific 
accomplishments in each criteria category, and Secretary-General Ban writes in his 
observations that “[t]he steady progress by Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions in the 
implementation of standards is encouraging and should be further accelerated.”191 
Secretary-General Ban’s assessment was not shared by all observers of the 
situation in Kosovo.  The Serbian interior minister released separate but equally scathing 
commentaries on both the SG report192 and the SRSG Technical Assessment,193 refuting 
each point for point.  These documents attributed the lack of Serb participation in the 
PISG itself and PISG-sponsored activities to security concerns stemming from the March 
2004 riots. 
Although the Serbian documents cannot be considered a truly impartial appraisal, 
they reference a November 2007 EU report which corroborated the Serb claims regarding 
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the PISG’s progress and Serb security concerns.194  The EU report noted the Kosovo 
Parliament’s “administrative and policy-making capacities remain limited,”195 and that 
Kosovo’s judicial system “remains weak” and “made little progress during the reporting 
period.”196  It also lamented the prominence of corruption and the PISG’s inability to 
promote and enforce human rights.197  The phrase, “[o]verall,  there  has  been  little 
progress” appears frequently throughout the report’s text. 
Additional evidence  indicates  the “Standards  for Kosovo” had not been met 
when Kosovo declared independence, especially where the rule of law is concerned.  
A  Human  Rights  Watch  report  issued  in  March  2008,  one  month  after  Kosovo 
declared independence, called the Kosovo justice system “inadequate” and “deeply 
divided  between  its  national  and  international  elements.”198    Of  eleven 
recommendations HRW had offered in the wake of the March 2004 riots, none had 
been fully implemented; six had been partially implemented and five had not been 
implemented  to  any  appreciable  degree.199    A  Journal  of Democracy  article  noted 
that  illegal occupations of Serb houses by Kosovar Albanians is often facilitated by 
Albanian leaders.200 
The preceding accumulation of evidence shows that Kosovo’s institutions, while 
established in form, remained immature in function at the time of Kosovo’s 
independence.  As the Journal of Democracy article stated, “While the structures of 
democracy have been established, and many of its practices entrenched, key features 
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associated with genuine democratic rule are missing.”201  Worse, as the Serbian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs documents point out, the UN reports offer only anecdotal, descriptive 
evidence of progress—no metrics are used to benchmark institutional performance 
quantitatively.202   
If a sub-state group’s capacity for governance is indeed a prerequisite for it to 
receive international support in its bid for independence, then the Kosovo government’s 
relative immaturity in this area should have precipitated warning signals when its intent 
to declare independence became apparent. That this was not the case undermines the 
institutional explanation for Kosovo’s independence.  Returning to the motive-means-
opportunity theme, the most that can be said for the institutional explanation is that 
Kosovo’s immature institutions provided a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
independence.  Although they provided some governance capacity for the newly-formed 
state—and thus a means to independence—this capacity was insufficient in and of itself 
to merit encouragement or recognition of independence. 
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IV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES REDUX: A SYSTEMIC 
EXPLANATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Having demonstrated that the historical and institutional explanations describe, 
respectively, potential motive and means for Kosovo’s independence, this study now 
examines the systemic explanation for evidence of opportunity.  This chapter details how 
the perceptions and motivations of each main actor involved in the international 
intervention and administration of Kosovo affected the approaches to resolving the status 
issue.  It posits that most of the Western powers, the United States in particular, did not 
appreciably distinguish between the Milošević regime in Belgrade and Serbian security 
forces in Kosovo on one hand and Kosovo’s civilian Serb population on the other.  As a 
consequence, UNMIK and KFOR were more disposed, on the whole, to accommodate 
Kosovar Albanian expectations at the expense of Kosovo’s Serbs, thus contributing to the 
perception that the international community had effectively, if unintentionally, 
partitioned Kosovo from Serbia.   
The “Standards before Status” policy, which sought to counter the perception of 
Kosovo as a de facto state by deferring any discussion of the province’s final status until 
it had achieved at least a nominal capacity for governance, exacerbated discontent among 
both Albanians and Serbs alike.  Rather than motivating more moderate elements of each 
camp to work, if not together, at least toward the common goal of improved living 
conditions, it instead incentivized each side’s hardliners to further polarize its respective 
constituency.  The policy thus had the unintended consequence of stunting growth and 
reform in the political and economic arenas, causing mounting frustrations that were 
especially acute among Kosovar Albanians.  These frustrations boiled over in March 
2004, when anti-minority riots shrouded the province in widespread violence.   
The riots represented a watershed moment.  Although Kosovo’s Albanians 
squandered over the course of two turbulent days the goodwill they had amassed over 
decades as the victims of Serb oppression, they had crossed their Rubicon:  the fragile 
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peace that had held for almost five years was shattered and could not be cobbled back 
together.  The failures of the international security forces to protect Kosovo’s minorities 
convinced Serbs both within and outside Kosovo that Serbs could not safely live in an 
Albanian-ruled Kosovo.  The riots also shocked Kosovo’s international administrators 
out of their false sense of security.203  Sensing that its window of opportunity was 
quickly closing, UNMIK attempted to fast-track specific elements of the Standards 
process while simultaneously addressing the Status issue in earnest for the first time.  
Almost inexorably, the UN increasingly came to hold that independence was the only 
feasible solution.  Thus, the implementation of international stewardship provided 
systemic opportunity for Kosovo to declare its independence, and one provision of 
Resolution 1244—autonomy for Kosovo—was achieved at the expense of another—
safeguarding the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. 
B. PERCEPTIONS AND MOTIVATIONS OF THE PEACEMAKERS:  THE 
SERBS AS THE “BAD GUYS” 
One manner of evaluating an organization’s performance is to examine its 
perspective of the environment as well as the motivations which govern its actions.  Any 
analysis of the systemic explanation for Kosovo’s independence therefore benefits from 
insight into the perceptions and motivations of those responsible for administering the 
province.  Specifically, understanding what those charged with nurturing governance and 
providing security within Kosovo held true about the environment within which they 
operated is of significant utility for determining why a given course of action was 
pursued.  In this way, these motivations and perceptions can be linked to the outcomes—
successful or otherwise—of the decisions they helped engender. 
There is ample evidence that Milošević and his Serbian security forces were 
viewed by American observers as the main antagonists within the Balkans.  This 
reputation was certainly well deserved given the extensive catalog of well-documented 
abuses and atrocities attributed to them during the war in Bosnia, especially the 1995 
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massacre of Muslims within the supposed UN “safe haven” of Srebrenica which “helped 
tip the balance within the [Clinton] Administration in favor of intervention.”204  The 
failure at Srebrenica was a UN failure and therefore a collective failure that quickly 
became a grim metaphor for Western inaction in the Balkans.  To Richard Holbrooke, the 
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs during the Bosnia war, such inaction 
represented “the greatest collective security failure of the West since the 1930s.”205  
Holbrooke later wrote, “‘For sheer intensity, nothing in the war matched, or would ever 
match, Srebrenica.  The name would become part of the language of horrors of modern 
war, alongside Lidice, Pradour, Babi Yar and the Katyn Forest.’”206  The excesses of the 
Serb military and paramilitary forces in Bosnia engendered a strident backlash in the 
halls of Washington and Brussels against all things Serbian—a backlash that appears to 
have extended to Serb civilians who did not participate in the violence, as demonstrated 
by international reaction to a Croatian offensive against Serb civilians in Croatia’s 
Krajina region less than one month after the Srebrenica massacre: 
By that time, however, it was hard for the world to see Serbian civilians 
themselves as victims needing protection.  “There is a sense in Western 
capitals that if something happens to the Krajina Serbs, they deserve it,” 
said one Western official less than a week before the exodus of two 
hundred thousand from Krajina.  Home to a largely Serbian population for 
four hundred years, Krajina was swept off the map in a mere forty-eight 
hours.207 
Holbrooke later served as President Clinton’s special envoy to the Balkans during 
the Kosovo crisis and was a forceful presence during the pre-Allied Force dialogue with 
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Belgrade and Priština.208  It should come as no surprise, then, that the specter of Bosnia 
cast a long shadow over the negotiations for ceasing hostilities.209  The peace talks 
eventually foundered over American insistence on deployment of a NATO (vice a UN) 
peacekeeping force with access to the entire interior of Yugoslavia.210  Although scholar 
Timothy Crawford asserts the Kosovar Albanian and Serbian factions alike shared blame 
for the diplomatic contortions that ultimately wrecked the tentative compromise reached 
in March 1999 at the French village of Rambouillet just weeks before the start of Allied 
Force,211 former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
sharply disparaged the agreement’s final text as “a terrible diplomatic document” and “an 
excuse to start bombing,” stating, “Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb 
could have accepted.”212  Former British Ministry of Defence official Lord Gilbert 
offered an equally blunt assessment: 
I think certain people were spoiling for a fight in NATO at that time....   If 
you ask my personal view, I think the terms put to Milošević at 
Rambouillet were absolutely intolerable; how could he possibly accept 
them; it was quite deliberate.  That does not excuse an awful lot of other 
things, but we were at a point when some people felt that something had to 
be done, so you just provoked a fight.213 
The insistence “that something had to be done” was a sentiment born from the 
carnage in Srebrenica and elsewhere in Bosnia.  The murders of 45 ethnic Albanians in 
the central Kosovo town of Râcak by Serbian forces three months before the Rambouillet 
talks began, labeled “a crime against humanity” by the head of the OSCE’s Kosovo 
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Verification Mission,214 bore grim resemblance to atrocities committed in Bosnia.  
President Clinton himself invoked Bosnia in justifying the American—and hence 
NATO’s—position:   
We learned that in the Balkans inaction in the face of brutality simply 
invites more brutality, but firmness can stop armies and save lives.  We 
must apply that lesson in Kosovo, before what happened in Bosnia 
happens there too.215 
Clinton’s point was a salient one, and Milošević and his cronies in the Yugoslav 
army certainly deserved their low reputations.  As Lord Gilbert stated, criticisms of the 
Rambouillet proceedings should in no way be construed as an apologetic for the then-
ongoing Serb atrocities against the Kosovar Albanians.  Nor do they negate the fact that 
many of the Serbian civilians in Kosovo supported and even benefitted from Milošević’s 
anti-Albanian pogroms, even if such approval did not constitute active participation.  
What Rambouillet revealed was that Milošević had exhausted the patience of the NATO 
allies—who, external appearances aside, disagreed among each other regarding the use of 
force—and that their subsequent decisions were shaped at least in part through the lens of 
the Bosnian conflict.  But this lens was imperfect.  If it revealed that the past of 
Srebrenica was made prologue at Rcak, it blinded them elsewhere:  to the threat posed 
to Serb civilians by the KLA216—or even everyday Kosovar Albanian eager to repay the 
wrongs visited upon them—and to the possibility that Krajina, like Srebrenica, might be 
repeated.  Even when such dangers were recognized early on, they were dismissed 
according to the logic of “collective responsibility,” as explained by French Foreign 
Minister Alain Richard in March 2000:  “The Serb-speaking Kosovars are paying the 
price for the ethnic oppression they failed to condemn when their neighbours were dying 
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from it.”217  Once on the ground in Kosovo, NATO’s KFOR forces may well have been 
influenced by anti-Serb sentiments stemming from the Bosnian experience.218  Remarks 
made by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Allied Force commander 
General Wesley Clark seemed to marginalize reports of reprisals against Serbs and other 
minorities after the NATO campaign and made it clear that, in at least some aspects, the 
West clearly still thought of the Serbs as the “bad guys.”219  As later events would show, 
it was Kosovo’s Serbian civilians who—like their kinsmen from Krajina—would suffer 
the greatest detriment of this Western antipathy.   
C.  “STANDARDS BEFORE STATUS”: A BLUEPRINT FOR STALEMATE? 
1. Striking a Precarious Balance 
After the failure of diplomacy and the termination of the subsequent NATO air 
campaign, the international community—under the aegis of the UN—set up shop in 
Kosovo.  As discussed in the preceding chapter, the “Standards before Status” approach 
sought to build up Kosovo’s governing institutions without conclusively specifying what 
relationship those institutions would eventually have to their counterparts in Belgrade, be 
it peer, associate, or subordinate.  In this sense, the policy reflected not only the 
competing provisions of Resolution 1244, but also the underlying lack of unity within the 
Security Council that produced them.  As will later be shown, such lack of unity would 
also be reflected in the structures and procedures of the various organizations responsible 
for implementing the provisions of Resolution 1244. 
The UNMIK “Standards before Status” approach was in effect an attempt to 
maintain the very delicate balance between sovereignty and self-determination, as 
discussed in Chapter III of this study, on the fulcrum of international intervention.  The 
longer this balance was maintained, the further the competing camps moved toward their 
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respective ends of the metaphorical lever in an attempt to tip the balance in their favor.  
For the Kosovar Albanians this meant backing the separatists within and without the 
PISG, while the Serbs gravitated toward hardliners who vowed Serbia would never be 
partitioned.  According to a 2005 policy analysis conducted by Vance Serchuk of the 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, the “Standards before Status” 
policy was akin to “[sweeping] under the rug the very thorny, existential dilemma about 
Kosovo’s self-determination that was the source of the Serb-Albanian conflict in the first 
place.”220  “The uncertainty hanging over the region’s fate,” wrote Serchuk, “has 
permeated—and infuriated—its politics over the past six years, providing fertile ground 
for movements ... that rally support by rejecting compromise.”221  Alexandros Yannis, a 
UNMIK insider privy to the challenges his organization faced, admitted “the uncertainty 
over the final status of Kosovo ... exacerbated the inherent difficulties” faced by UNMIK 
and KFOR in dealing with rival camps bent on maximalist gains.222 
2. The Economics of “Standards Before Status” 
The deleterious effect of the “Standards before Status” approach was not confined 
to the civic arena.  Ample evidence suggests the policy weighed like an anchor on the 
fragile Kosovar economy by depriving it of desperately-needed foreign investment.  A 
2008 House of Representatives hearing on Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
observed that “[a]s long as Kosovo’s final status remained unresolved, businesses were 
reluctant to invest there, and international financial institutions were unable to offer the 
needed monetary assistance."223  Martti Ahtisaari, UNSG Ban Ki-moon’s Special Envoy 
for Kosovo’s future status, offered a more pointed assessment: 
Kosovo’s uncertain political status has left it unable to access international 
financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy or attract 
the foreign capital it needs to invest in basic infrastructure and redress 
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widespread poverty and unemployment.... Kosovo’s weak economy is, in 
short, a source of social and political instability, and its recovery cannot be 
achieved under the status quo of international administration. 
Considering a UN organization—UNMIK—was the lead element of the “international 
administration” whose utility Ahtisaari questioned, Secretary-General Ban’s public 
release of Ahtisaari’s report was a tacit admission of the UN’s own shortcomings in 
Kosovo.  Serchuk, writing in 2005, provided salient evidence of UNMIK’s inefficacy: 
Until quite recently, for instance, UNMIK refused to pursue a 
comprehensive privatization of Kosovo’s moldering industry, on the basis 
that it lacked the legal basis to do so. Trusteeship thus became 
synonymous with a stagnant, basket-case economy in the minds of the 
Albanian public, who were encouraged in this belief by an indigenous 
leadership all too happy to pass blame for the province’s myriad problems 
to the international community.224 
Because it was not a recognized state, Kosovo was unable to borrow from 
development banks the funds necessary to rebuild its war-torn facilities.225  In the 
absence of international investment, member nations of the UN and the EU flooded 
Kosovo with financial aid to help rebuild the province’s industrial, civic, and financial 
infrastructure.  According to researchers Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, this aid 
may actually have helped sustain the economic infirmity it was intended to remedy by 
creating “structural distortions in [Kosovo’s economy, in this case] rather than genuine 
development in the sense of sustainable material advance and improvement of living 
conditions.”226  Bernauer and Ruloff pointed out waste and corruption as two negative 
consequences of such aid.227  Corruption in particular was so rampant in Kosovo that the 
UN’s Directorate of Organized Crime openly stated its assumption “that a corporate 
structure of organized crime and corruption is behind every political party.”228   
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Another economic distortion associated with international aid stemmed from the 
apartheid-like system Milošević had engineered in Kosovo.  Since virtually all 
professional administrators and technicians there were Serbian, the reversal of fortune 
that befell them after Allied Force and the subsequent anti-Serb reprisals inflicted a brain 
drain on the already tottering Kosovar economy.229  Yannis noted the arrival of UNMIK, 
KFOR, and various other agencies had mixed economic results.  The immediate spike in 
demand for labor provided unprecedented job opportunities for Albanians who had 
experienced unemployment rates as high as 70 percent,230 thus providing an important 
“short-term psychological impact.”231  While many of these new openings were unskilled 
positions, however, the salaries paid by the international organizations exceeded not only 
those of comparable jobs in Kosovo’s private sector, but also those of semi-skilled and 
skilled positions as well.  “In consequence,” wrote Yannis, “the much needed skilled 
workers with professional expertise ... ended up being underutilized as drivers and 
security jobs,” resulting in a “serious distortion of the labor market, as it [was] not a 
sustainable response to the structural problems of the economy.”232  Although Kosovo’s 
construction sector quickly expanded with the arrival of UNMIK and KFOR and foreign-
funded infrastructure rebuilds, this uptick was confined to the “immediate post-war 
period.”233 
3. Mirror Images 
Because the “Standards before Status” policy encouraged maximalist elements of 
both parties to the conflict, it served to ossify the parallel civic and economic structures 
that had emerged before Allied Force.  Hardliner Serbs and Kosovar Albanians alike had 
their reasons for preserving these institutions, the former to undermine any conception of 
de facto independence for Kosovo, the latter because of the informal economic and 
service networks developed during the past decade of Belgrade’s anti-Albanian policies.  
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Nowhere was this phenomenon more evident than in the divided northern city of 
Mitrovica, where Serbs and Kosovar-Albanians operated parallel government structures 
on their respective sides of the Ibar River dividing the municipality.  For example, 
Mitrovica Serbs conducted transactions in dinars instead of the euro used elsewhere in 
Kosovo and traveled to Belgrade without PISG-issued passports.234 
One of the main consequences of these dual institutions was the rapid emergence 
of an informal economy in Kosovo that often helped finance criminal activity.235  Yannis 
noted that “[t]his well-established informal—and often criminal—economy and its close 
ties with political extremism were exacerbated by the NATO intervention.”236  Because 
of the disconnects between UNMIK and CIVPOL—which will be discussed in greater 
detail shortly—and the initial lack of a functioning organic police force within Kosovo 
following Allied Force, criminal elements with connections to both organized crime and 
the KLA were able to make and consolidate gains.237  According to Yannis, NATO’s 
“zero casualties” philosophy greatly hobbled early efforts to combat both criminality and 
extremism.238  As a result of parallel structures and the funding of hardliners through 
criminal activity, the social and civic intersections between ethnic Albanians and Serbs 
who had frequent contact with each other before Allied Force diminished precipitously.   
4. “And Justice for None” 
One of the international administration’s most significant shortcomings was its 
failure to establish rule of law early on in its tenure.  This was demonstrated at the outset 
when KFOR openly failed to stop ethnic Albanians from conducting reprisals against 
Serbs and other minorities—including fellow Albanians perceived as collaborators with 
the Serbian authorities.239  “The orders are to let them pillage,” replied a French KFOR 
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soldier when asked why his squad did not intervene as Albanian villagers vandalized and 
looted a Serbian Orthodox church.  “Of course it’s mad, but those are our orders.”240  The 
reprisals had an effect similar to the atrocities that inspired them:  a Human Rights Watch 
report estimated that 150,000 Serbs, Roma, and other members of Kosovo minority 
groups fled the province within the first six weeks after Allied Force.241  “In mid-1999, 
there were no more than a handful of U.N. police, leaving NATO's KFOR troops to 
perform civilian policing functions for which they were ill-prepared,” 
 stated the report, noting that “NATO was largely preoccupied with protecting its own 
troops, rather than defending civilians.”242 
This failure to establish rule of law was not limited to the streets of Kosovo.  It 
extended into the court room, where victims of crime anguished over the inability of a 
hopelessly inadequate system to dispense justice.  “Establishing a functioning legal 
system should have been a top priority for UNMIK,” wrote Yannis, “but it was not."243  
Serb leaders in Kosovo reported that 60 percent of attacks on Serbs and their property 
went unreported because of fears of reprisals and lack of faith in Kosovo’s police 
force.244  Serbs from rural areas, unable to tend or even visit their fields, were often too 
intimidated to pursue legal action against those who had dispossessed them of their 
land.245  Kosovo’s Albanians also suffered from this lack of judicial capacity, with a 
2009 Amnesty International report finding that UNMIK, through its profound lack of 
progress in resolving cases of abductions and disappearances pre-dating Allied Force, had 
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failed to live up to its obligations under international law246 and thus contributed to what 
Human Rights Watch termed “an atmosphere of impunity.”247  As another Amnesty 
International report noted: 
[T]he performance over more than seven years of the International Judges 
and Prosecutors Programme established by the UNMIK Department of 
Judicial Affairs ... has failed to meet up to expectations. Local prosecutors 
and judges are little better prepared to conduct proceedings in cases 
involving crimes under international law, and legal reforms essential for 
conducting such proceedings still have not been enacted into law.248 
It is little wonder, then, that Serbs and Albanians alike felt deprived of justice under 
Kosovo’s international administration. 
5. Climbing the “Escalation Ladder” 
To be sure, UNMIK and KFOR entered an already-poisoned environment within 
Kosovo.  The Kosovar Albanians had endured the privations of Milošević’s anti-
Albanian policies during the decade preceding Allied Force and the subsequent horrors of 
ethnic cleansing that precipitated the NATO campaign, and as such had great reason to 
distrust the Serbs.  Yet as shown in Chapter II, the two groups had still maintained at 
least some tentative social ties.  After the establishment of UNMIK and the adoption of 
“Standards before Status,” however, Kosovo became multi-ethnic in name only, with 
minorities either cloistering themselves within enclaves or fleeing Kosovo altogether in 
the face of reprisals by the ethnic Albanian majority.249  “A multi-ethnic Kosovo,” stated 
a 2006 report of the International Commission on the Balkans, “does not exist except in 
the bureaucratic assessments of the international community.”250  Although KFOR found 
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this arrangement more conducive to providing security to Serbs and other minorities, it 
offered little in the way of engendering civic dialogue between the two groups.  As 
Serchuck noted, “Most [minorities] live in an archipelago of impoverished, embittered 
enclaves, bounded by barbwire, burnt houses, and NATO peacekeepers.”251  Although 
written in 2005, this passage nonetheless held at least partial truth before the March 2004 
riots. 
This lack of social and civic interaction, while initiated by the Milošević regime, 
was unintentionally perpetuated by the international administrators and thus became yet 
another artifact of the UNMIK/KFOR legacy in applying the “Standards before Status” 
approach.  To be sure, some progress was made within specific locales, of which the most 
notable is Štrpce in southern Kosovo near the Macedonian border, labeled by the 
International Crisis Group as a “model Serb enclave.”252  It is also undeniable that 
leaders on both sides of the equation greeted mediation attempts with maximalist 
demands.  Still, the international administration’s unwillingness and inability to address 
the parallel structures and the economic conditions which contributed to them reinforced 
the divisions between Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs.  In this sense, the international 
administrators did not nurture reconciliation efforts to the fullest extent possible. 
Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall describe the need to 
achieve political closure between combatants as the first step in conflict de-escalation.253  
The “Standards before Status” approach, with its intentional ambiguity on Kosovo’s final 
status, effectively prevented political closure from occurring.  As a result, attempts to 
reconcile the Albanian and Serb populations occurred within the context of competing 
visions for the future.  Unable to descend past the top rung of the “escalation 
ladder”254—the authors’ logical construct for the resolution process—both sides were 
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forced to explore alternate paths.  The Serbs [living in Serbia], freed from the harsh 
economic sanctions levied against Yugoslavia for the latter half of the 1990s, seemed to 
choose what the three authors call “official amnesia.”255  Journalist Andrew Purvis, 
writing during Milošević’s 2002 trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, found that not only had Milošević’s popularity rebounded alongside 
a resurgent nationalism among Serbs, but that his absurd denials concerning atrocities 
were shared by his former constituents: 
In cafes from Belgrade to Bujanovac, a kind of collective amnesia is 
setting in. ‘Mass graves? People don't believe in mass graves anymore,’ 
says Natasa Kandic, a human rights investigator who documented war 
crimes in Kosovo. ‘We haven't touched on our own responsibility.’256 
Similar accounts appeared in media reports worldwide during the time period between 
Allied Force and Purvis’ dateline.257 
Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians, by contrast, have opted for “retaliation.”  The 
authoring trio’s subtitle to this approach, “cleaning the slate by avenging the past,” and 
their descriptions of “traditions of clan-based reprisal and vendetta,”258 describe in a very 
literal sense what has happened to Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo since Allied 
Force and the advent of UNMIK and KFOR.  Fittingly, the authors use the Balkans as 
their primary example of such traditions.   
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D. SHOCKWAVES:  THE RIOTS OF MARCH 2004 
1. Ethnic Tectonic Plates 
UNMIK’s and KFOR’s unintentional contributions to polarization in Kosovo 
through “Standards before Status” yielded a bitter harvest late in the winter of 2004.  As 
with colliding tectonic plates, the tensions between Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians and Serbs 
and the frustrations of each with the “Standards before Status” process could build for 
only so long before erupting in a paroxysm of violence.  The first tremors rumbled 
through northern Kosovo over the course of the first two years after Allied Force when 
Mitrovica was racked by episodes of ethnic violence, some of which turned against 
KFOR and UNMIK forces.259  As a 2002 report by the International Crisis Group noted, 
“the events in the North signal that the fight to determine the final status of Kosovo is 
underway.”260 
The eruption came on 17 March 2004, the day after three Albanian children had 
drowned in the Ibar River.  Various ethnic Albanian media outlets reported that the 
children had drowned while fleeing Serb “bandits” from the Serb-dominated northern 
half of the city261—claims an official UNMIK inquiry later found unsubstantiated.262  
The reports drove Kosovo’s Albanian population to the streets. Riots soon broke out 
across the province and raged for two days.  UNMIK CIVPOL, KFOR, and KPS forces, 
outnumbered by rioters by almost a two-to-one ratio, were overwhelmed.  Although the 
number of deaths and injuries were relatively low compared to the scale of the violence, 
thousands of Serbs were left homeless.  Many Bosnian Serbs who had resettled in  
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Kosovo after being driven from their homes earlier in the decade were again displaced, as 
were Kosovar Serbs who fled the province during Allied Force and upon returning found 
their homes had been destroyed.263 
2. “Failure to Protect”:  An Indictment of UNMIK and KFOR 
In some ways, the March 2004 riots served as a metaphor for the numerous 
shortcomings UNMIK and KFOR exhibited from the outset.  As UNMIK built up its 
CIVPOL force and disarmament of the KLA progressed, NATO steadily decreased its 
troop strength in Kosovo.  KFOR, citing an “improved security environment” in 2002, 
cut its forces to 39,000 from an initial post-Allied Force strength of 50,000.264  That 
number had fallen to 26,000 by June of 2003, and by the end of that same year—just 
three months before the riots—it reached less than 18,000.265  As KFOR downsized its 
presence, its security functions were ceded to UNMIK and, increasingly so, to KPS, a 
process referred to as “normalization.”266  As previously mentioned, NATO reduced its 
troop strength faster than CIVPOL and KPS could build theirs up, and as a result the 
combined strength of these three security organizations at the time of the riots stood at 
less than 27,000—or just over half the estimated number of rioters.267   
Numerical inferiority was probably the least of the problems security forces 
encountered during the riots.  Lacking the training and equipment to engage in effective 
crowd control and dispersal, outnumbered KFOR soldiers were “caught between 
ineffectively attempting to stop mobs with their bare hands and firing live rounds at 
them”—the latter of which was fortunately rare.268  Writing in the months following 
Allied Force, William O’Neill observed that some KFOR soldiers failed to realize that 
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their original mission—protecting ethnic Albanians from Serb atrocities—had been 
obviated by the withdrawal of Serb forces from the province.269  O’Neill’s sentiment was 
reflected years later by an exasperated UNMIK official’s derision of NATO’s 
performance during the riots: 
We always knew that Kosovo would not be invaded.  KFOR is in Kosovo 
to protect against civil violence, disturbances, and ethnic violence.  They 
don’t need tanks but riot gear and shields, and soldiers trained in dealing 
with public disorder.  If KFOR was not prepared for such civil disorder, 
then why the heck not?  What did they think they were in Kosovo for?270 
KFOR had not learned its lesson from its earliest experiences in Kosovo.  Five years after 
Allied Force, it still thought the Serbs were the “bad guys.” 
Another shortcoming evident in the responses—or lack thereof—to the riots was 
the lack of coordination, both within each security organization in the form of command 
and control and among the three in the form of collaboration.  At the time of the riots, 
KFOR was divided into four geographic regions—north, east, center, and southwest—
with one NATO Multinational Brigade (MNB) assigned to each.271  Cooperation 
between MNBs was characterized as “the exception rather than the rule,” often relying on 
the initiative of those at the lower unit level using personal cellular phones.272  In 
addition to the insular nature of these geographic zones, there was no single command 
structure for making and disseminating decisions.  NATO deployed a KFOR commander 
(COM-KFOR) and command staff to Kosovo, but the designation has been described as 
“ceremonial.”273  Speaking one month after the riots, a KFOR spokesman stated, “COM-
KFOR cannot give brigade commanders orders, but the brigade commanders receive 
guidance from COM-KFOR.”274  Additionally, many NATO countries placed specific 
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restrictions, or “caveats,” on their own forces in Kosovo and required them to consult 
their home governments before executing NATO orders.275   
As a result of these internal inconsistencies, KFOR’s performance during the riots 
was mixed, and its forces often worked at cross-purposes with CIVPOL and KPS.  Many 
of these shortcomings were documented in a Human Rights Watch report aptly titled, 
“Failure to Protect.”  For example, French KFOR forces did not intervene when rioters 
burned the Serb village of Svinjare—137 homes—within sight of the French logistics 
base.276  A French KFOR spokesman later claimed the French had insufficient troops to 
challenge the arsonists.277  Similarly, German troops confronted by rioters near Prizren 
evacuated the remaining monks from the fourteenth-century Monastery of the 
Archangels, which the crowd subsequently burned down.278  According to Human Rights 
Watch, “The monastery’s only access point was a narrow road through [a] gorge; as such, 
it should have been easily defensible.... ‘The Germans didn’t use their truncheons or tear 
gas, and didn’t even fire in the air,’ one of the monks recalled.”279  Italian troops 
“rescuing” Serbs seeking refuge in an Orthodox church surrounded by a mob did not 
force a cordon through the crowd, “but instead obliged the Serbs to run to them through a 
gauntlet of young Albanians who attacked them with bricks and knives.”280  Only the 
presence of an American-led UNMIK police unit—one of whose female officers shot and 
killed a knife-wielding Kosovar Albanian who had already murdered an elderly Serb and 
was threatening a Serb youth—prevented a large-scale tragedy.281 
UNMIK also gave an overall poor accounting of itself during the riots.  The 
CIVPOL command structure, like that of KFOR’s, “virtually collapsed during the onset 
of the crisis” at “both the political and security level.”282  As a result CIVPOL “was 
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reduced to creating a crisis management system ad hoc as the crisis unfolded.”283  One 
report noted that CIVPOL’s multi-national composition hindered the development of 
esprit de corps.284  As with KFOR, the cumulative result of these factors was a wide 
variance in CIVPOL’s performance during the riots.  On one end of the spectrum, a 
group of ethnic Albanian teenagers was able to torch a Priština church because “nobody 
with rank mobilized [the 120 UN and KPS officers at the nearby UNMIK police 
headquarters] to take on the crowd,” while at the other end a CIVPOL commander 
“[faced] a stone-throwing mob without body armor.”285   
Perhaps the most alarming example of inefficacy demonstrated during the 
violence was the abject failure of KFOR and CIVPOL to work with each other and with 
KPS toward a common goal.  In Mitrovica, “French KFOR treated CIVPOL and KPS at 
best as impediments”286 before the riots broke out.  French troops reacted to the outbreak 
of the violence by forcibly ejecting both KPS and their CIVPOL liaisons from the 
southern half of the city, instructing KPS officers via telephone not to report to work, and 
taking over KPS and CIVPOL facilities.287  In the American-led eastern sector, U.S. 
forces had previously marginalized KPS authority by aligning with KPC elements 
there.288  Although KFOR mounted some joint patrols with KPS officers in the aftermath 
of the violence,289 by any account the KFOR-CIVPOL-KPS relationship was at best 
counter-productive when it mattered most—during the riots.  As a result, the “failure to 
protect” was made complete. 
3. Aftershocks: The Impact of the Riots on Kosovo’s Status 
Numerous post-riot analyses singled out the “Standards before Status” approach 
and the resulting discontent as primary underlying causes for the riots.  “Deep 
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dissatisfaction within Kosovo society about the lack of progress in resolving the final 
status,” observed Human Rights Watch, “left the province ripe for unrest."290  The 
International Crisis Group stated, “The lack of progress over final status and the absence 
of any indication how much longer UNMIK's mandate would last were sources of 
frustration.”291  A post-riot analysis appearing in International Peacekeeping cited “the 
indecision on a final status” as “a key problem.”292  In testimony before the House 
Committee on International Relations, Balkan Affairs Advisor to the Albanian-American 
Civic League Shirley Cloyes DioGuardi asserted, “The world should be surprised not that 
violence erupted in [Kosovo], but that it has happened so rarely in a society whose 
political and economic future has been held hostage to lack of final status for the past six 
years.”293  Finally, UNMIK’s own internal postmortem on the riots acknowledged: 
The dominant factor that produced the upheaval of violence on 17–18 
March was mounting frustration and apprehension caused by Kosovo’s 
uncertain future status. This existential issue had remained stalemated for 
nearly five years, since the beginning of the mission.294 
Although the preceding passage demonstrates that frustrations with the social, 
civic, and economic stagnation resulting from the “Standards before Status” policy 
created a volatile atmosphere in Kosovo, it should be noted that these conditions alone do 
not wholly explain the violence of March 2004.  For example, a study conducted jointly 
by the Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) and the Cooperative for Assistance 
and Relief Everywhere (CARE) determined that while lack of economic opportunity 
“increased frustration and anger,” it was not a direct cause of ethnic violence.295  
Evidence exists that at least some of the violence was premeditated and orchestrated.  
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The two main indicators here are the presence of non-local rioters at various locations 
within Kosovo and the uncanny precision with which minority houses and cultural sites 
were attacked.  Human Rights Watch reported that “[o]nce the violence began, it swept 
throughout Kosovo with almost clinical precision,” leaving Albanian homes in the 
affected regions unscathed but sparing none belonging to minorities.296  The International 
Crisis Group found “reports of hardcore groups travelling long distances to join, some in 
buses.”297  In the words of EU High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security 
Javier Solana, “It may have been a moment of spontaneity, but ... a lot of people (were) 
organized to take advantage of that moment of spontaneity.”298 
Regardless of the extent to which they were planned, the riots undoubtedly 
represented a watershed moment for Kosovo because they openly called into question the 
wisdom of the “Standards before Status” policy.299  Because the roots of the violence 
were inextricably linked to the policy, UNMIK came under intense internal and external 
pressure to change its approach.  Some reports asserted the calamity brought about a 
change in the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Kosovo.300  The new 
SRSG, Søren Jessen-Petersen, sought to fast-track the now-renamed “Standards for 
Kosovo,” simultaneously engaging with local authorities and directing renewed emphasis 
on Kosovo’s stagnant economy.301  When UNMIK hurriedly introduced the Kosovo 
Standards Implementation Plan on 31 March 2004, it added “Cultural Heritage” as an 
“extra” standard in direct response to the devastation the riots wreaked upon Serbian 
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Orthodox churches, monasteries, and graves.302  Although laudable, such efforts were 
considered too little, too late, as evidenced by the marked shift in perceptions and 
attitudes that soon became apparent.  Just as the specter of Bosnia had dominated 
Western thinking on Kosovo prior to March 2004, so too did the specter of the riots haunt 
the West’s every subsequent action and utterance regarding Kosovo as UNMIK 
attempted to regroup and forge ahead. 
The urgency to kick-start the “Standards” process was accompanied by 
expressions of willingness to entertain the “Status” issue.  This development was no 
doubt meant to encourage conciliation and compromise between Kosovo’s Albanian and 
Serb populations, but the riots had noticeably changed the calculus in Kosovo.  
Understandably, Kosovo’s Serbs felt acutely betrayed by UNMIK and KFOR.  Most 
either retreated to the relative safety of Serb enclaves north of the Ibar River or fled 
Kosovo completely.  This sense of betrayal was poignantly captured in an interview with 
one of the Serb victims of the riots: 
For the last five years, so many internationals have come to study our 
problems that I can’t even count them anymore, and they have produced 
tons of reports and recommendations. In the end, the result was that I lost 
everything I have built for forty years, while the international community 
watched from a few hundred meters away. I don’t even have a single 
photograph left from my life. And now they tell me to go back and rebuild 
my life—how can I trust them?303 
Although Kosovo’s Albanian leaders belatedly realized what their woefully 
inadequate reaction to the riots had cost them in terms of international sympathy and 
support,304 they were quick to recognize the potential leverage the violence had provided 
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them.  They had reminded their Serb neighbors in both Kosovo and Belgrade that they—
not the Serbs—held the decisive demographic advantage in Kosovo.305  “The riots,” 
wrote one analyst, “were clearly intended to demonstrate who controlled the streets, and 
that there were limits to what the ‘people’ would tolerate.”306  These leaders, who had 
initially refused to condemn the violence,307 suddenly saw themselves as being in a 
position of strength, and many local ethnic Albanian politicians abandoned their platform 
of “patient compromise” in favor of a “bargaining” posture virtually overnight.308  There 
was a sense that Kosovo’s Albanian population had collectively sent an unmistakable 
message to the larger world that they were much more than idle spectators in the ongoing 
definition of Kosovo’s future.  According to one report: 
[T]here was a discernible sense of hopeful expectation ... about the 
possibilities the violence might have opened up for breaking the Kosovo 
status logjam. The new LDK-affiliated newspaper Pavarësia let this into 
full view ..., publishing an interview with Arian Starova, former foreign 
minister and now a member of Albania's parliament, entitled: "[The latest 
events] shortened Kosovo's road to independence.”309 
The Rubicon had been crossed. Although the UN continued to push for improvements in 
Standards, its ensuing efforts were henceforth increasingly focused on addressing the 
Status issue. 
In the aftermath of the death, destruction, displacement, and injury wrought by the 
violence, an additional tragedy went unrecognized initially: despite the tense situation, 
the riots could have been defused had Kosovo’s international administrators recognized 
and addressed the warning signs and set better precedents earlier in their tenure.  O’Neill 
provided an especially salient anecdote soon after the establishment of UNMIK and 
KFOR: 
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Many Albanians I interviewed shared the view that if KFOR and UNMIK 
had acted with greater toughness, rigor, and clarity in the early days, 
violence would have diminished and many problems relating to security, 
economic development, and the relations between ethnic communities 
would also have been less grave.  One insisted that the international 
community should have stated on June 12, 2000, that ... "we won’t let you 
exploit ethnic grievances or divisions.... This is hypocrisy.”310 
Having set this precedent from the outset, UNMIK and particularly KFOR chose to live 
with it instead of working to correct it.  The International Crisis Group’s report on the 
riots bears a disconcerting congruity to O’Neill’s account:  “Each of the two ignition 
points [of the riots] could have been suppressed if KFOR and the police had been more 
alert.... With proactive responses, much of the conflagration of 17-18 March [2004] could 
have been prevented.”311  Indeed, the isolated successes of specialized British and Polish 
units during the riots proved that a small, well-disciplined, properly-trained force could 
effectively contain a much larger crowd of rioters;312 yet such incidents were the 
exception rather than the rule.  As a result, multiple opportunities to defuse the charged 
atmosphere of post-war Kosovo were lost. 
4. End Game:  Fool’s Gambit? 
Following the riots, Kosovo’s independence unfolded in an atmosphere of nigh-
inevitability via a sequence of studies and reports.  Soon after the violence ended, UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan tasked Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide with generating 
options for Kosovo’s future.313  Eide’s report, delivered to the UN Security Council in 
August 2004, confirmed fears that the window of opportunity for a managed Status 
solution was quickly sliding shut.  Stating that “future status discussions ... cannot be 
postponed much longer,”314 Eide called for such talks to begin in autumn 2004.315  
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Noting that the KISP, while useful, was too ambitious to be credible, Eide advocated 
replacing the hard, fixed coupling between Standards and Status with a more incremental, 
flexible approach.316   
One year after delivering Kai’s report to the Security Council—and seven months 
after the International Commission on the Balkans issued its own report calling for a 
four-phased approach to Kosovo’s independence317—Secretary-General Annan 
appointed Finnish diplomat Martti Ahtisaari as a Special Envoy and charged him with 
building a framework for determining Kosovo’ final status.318  After more than a year of 
intense negotiations with Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian leadership, their Serb counterparts 
both within the province and in Belgrade, and other interested third parties, Ahtisaari 
issued a report proclaiming talks on Kosovo’s status a stalemate; recognizing that neither 
reintegration into Serbia nor indefinite international administration were feasible options, 
Ahtisaari recommended the province begin a phased transition to independence.319  The 
European Council added its voice to the independence chorus, echoing the UN’s 
concerns for regional stability in the Balkans.320  Although Ahtisaari was careful to 
portray the Kosovo case as sui generis, his conclusion acknowledged the role of 
Resolution 1244 in creating the very narrow circumstances which now necessitated 
Kosovo’s independence.321  In February 2008, less than a year after Ahtisaari’s report 
was released, Kosovo declared its independence.  Although Serbia vehemently protested 
the declaration as “flagrant violation of the Serbian Constitution, Resolution 1244, the 
Helsinki Final Act and the UN Charter,”322 many Western nations (including the United 
States) formally recognized Kosovo’s independence. 
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The term “fool’s gambit” refers to a chess opening that dooms the player making 
the first move to lose.  While a chess player arguably has a far greater number of opening 
moves available to him or her than did the international community in addressing post-
Allied Force Kosovo, the metaphor is logically appropriate for the systemic explanation 
for Kosovo’s independence.  The UN and NATO made early missteps that ultimately 
decreased their collective ability to maintain balance between goals that admittedly were 
nearly mutually exclusive.  Having set out with the expressed intent of pursuing these 
competing goals, the UN ultimately realized it could not achieve in Kosovo what 
historian Timothy Garton Ash referred to as “virginity and motherhood”323—respect for 
Yugoslavia’s sovereignty simultaneous with autonomy for Kosovo—and that its own 
actions, along with those of KFOR, helped precipitate what it had sought to avoid. 
E. PAINTED INTO A CORNER:  EVALUATING THE SYSTEMIC 
EXPLANATION 
Of the three explanations this study examines, the systemic explanation contains 
the most explanatory power regarding the origins of Kosovo’s independence.  Whereas 
the historical explanation establishes motive and the institutional explanation describes 
means, the systemic explanation accounts for opportunity:  the international community, 
under the aegis of UNMIK, created conditions which ultimately made Kosovo’s 
independence inevitable.  Evidence of this potentiality was available early on, as 
indicated by an independent analysis of the Ahtisaari report:  “Resolution 1244 can 
realistically be read in only one way.  The Council implicitly recognised that Kosovo 
remaining as part of Serbia—even as a highly autonomous entity—would not be 
sufficient to promote long-term peace and stability.”324   
Kosovo’s international administrators failed to establish rule of law, to provide 
equal protection to all regardless of ethnicity, and to address sufficiently the province’s 
faltering economy.  These failures directly contributed to increased polarization.  By 
actively—if unintentionally—participating in “a policy of reverse discrimination in 
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Kosovo,”325 UNMIK and KFOR unwittingly empowered Kosovar Albanian extremists 
and Belgrade hardliners alike.  Thus, selective and inconsistent implementation of 
Resolution 1244, together with the “Standards before Status” policy, created the 
conditions for the March 2004 riots, which in hindsight could have been prevented, or at 
least mitigated. 
The riots became the catalyst for addressing Kosovo’s status.  As Serchuk wrote 
in the fall of 2005, “It was out of the ashes of the March 2004 conflagration that the effort 
to settle Kosovo’s fate emerged.”326  But the situation had already reached its tipping 
point.  With Kosovo’s minorities cowering in their enclaves or fleeing the province 
altogether, UNMIK’s vision of a multi-ethnic Kosovo was relegated to the realm of 
dreams.  The Kosovar Albanian leadership traded international goodwill for bargaining 
power in the form of implicit threats of mob violence, while the Serbs, nursing their sense 
of betrayal, stonewalled all avenues of negotiation.  Both sides dug in, removing the 
possibility of further compromise.  UNMIK had painted itself into a corner; as scholar 
Juan Pekmez presciently wrote six months into UNMIK’s existence, “Having shown 
itself to be incapable of reversing this trend, the Kosovo peace mission has settled into a 
policy of fait accompli.”327  Intentions to the contrary aside, the international 
administration in Kosovo created a situation with only one possible outcome, and in 
doing so provided Priština its long-sought opportunity to declare independence. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This study has approached Kosovo’s independence as a mystery to be solved 
through establishment of motive, means, and opportunity.  The preceding chapters have 
examined three explanations for Kosovo’s independence—one historical, one 
institutional, and one systemic—to determine the degree to which international 
intervention and administration in Kosovo might have contributed to each element of this 
mystery.  Those chapters have demonstrated that the international community, under the 
aegis of UNMIK and NATO, made material contributions to both the means by which 
Kosovo declared its independence and the opportunity under which it was able to so do.   
Kosovo’s motive for declaring independence was, unsurprisingly, the inverse of 
Belgrade’s argument that Kosovo must remain part of Serbia.  Both nations claimed 
Kosovo as an ancestral homeland, yet an untenable imbalance emerged between the 
Serbs’ near-monopoly on political power and the Kosovar Albanians’ demographic 
dominance.  While ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences undeniably exist, the most 
rigorous research demonstrates that the very real animosity between the two groups is 
less a function of “ancient” ethnic hatreds than of recurring nationalism since the 
nineteenth century and—even more so—of the anti-Albanian polemics and policies of the 
Milošević era.  In consequence, the historical explanation lacks the explanatory power 
necessary to buttress the null hypothesis, which states that Kosovo’s independence was 
inevitable due to the historical inability of Kosovar Albanians and Serbs to coexist in a 
state dominated by the latter.  While the historical explanation serves to establish motive, 
it does not account for means or opportunity and thus provides insufficient basis for 
asserting that Kosovo’s independence would have occurred absent the international 
community’s intervention. 
If the historical explanation is most closely associated with Kosovo’s motives for 
seeking independence, the institutional explanation describes the means by which it 
sought to demonstrate its capacity to govern.  This study has shown sovereignty to be an 
essentially contested concept:  its shared meaning can be challenged and changed over 
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time.  In the case of Kosovo, the Western world affirmed the legitimacy of divisible 
sovereignty and relational sovereignty by rewarding Priština’s increased capacity for 
governance with greater autonomy.  As a result, Yugoslavia no longer had a monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force within Kosovo; its sovereignty there was curtailed.  The 
international community, however, was unable to resolve the dilemma of parallel 
structures, and Kosovo’s institutions were insufficiently mature to warrant international 
recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty.  Like the historical explanation, therefore, the 
institutional explanation lacks sufficiency. 
The systemic explanation holds the most explanatory power of the three explored 
because it most convincingly establishes causality between the international 
administration of Kosovo and Kosovo’s declaration of independence.  It indicates 
correlation between Western anti-Serb biases and the inefficacy of UNMIK and KFOR 
policies in meeting the established objectives of Resolution 1244.  Particularly salient is 
the correlation between these preconceptions and the inability of international security 
forces to prevent anti-minority violence during the riots of March 2004.  The riots can be 
attributed at least in part to widespread discontent with the Standards before Status 
policy, and they represented a discernable turning point in Kosovo.  Although UNMIK 
changed its approach in the wake of the riots, building a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo 
was no longer an achievable goal; the international administration had unintentionally 
created conditions under which independence was the only realistic option. 
The fact that only a minority of the world’s nations has recognized Kosovo’s 
independence speaks to the relevance of investigating how and why that independence 
was achieved.  Numbering among those nations which have not recognized Kosovo are 
several members of NATO and the EU, most of whom supported the NATO military 
campaign which precipitated adoption of Resolution 1244 and the creation of UNMIK 
and KFOR.  Spain and Greece, for example, are both home to separatists factions for 
whom the Kosovo case could set an either promising or problematic precedent, 
depending on one’s viewpoint.328   
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Despite the ICJ’s ruling that Kosovo’s declaration was permissible under 
international law, Kosovo’s status continues to serve as an irritant between the Western 
states who favored the international intervention on the one hand and those who opposed 
it on the other.  Russia and China, which face separatist movements in Chechnya and 
Xinxiang, respectively,329 have been particularly vocal in their opposition to the 
intervention in Kosovo and have refused to recognize its independence.  The increasingly 
prominent role these two non-Western powers will likely play in the twenty-first century 
increases the importance of understanding sources of disagreement stemming from the 
previous century. 
Finally, both the UN and the ICJ were careful to describe the Kosovo case as sui 
generis.  In truth, every case of potential international intervention possesses its own 
distinct aspects and circumstances and is therefore unique.  The existing inclination 
within the Western portion of the international community to intervene on behalf of those 
deprived of governance is unlikely to dissipate in the near future.  It is the present 
author’s hope that this study will contribute to an increased appreciation for those 
features unique to every such crisis and encourage increased scrutiny of the manner in 
which those unique characteristics may cause international agencies responding to the 
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